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ABSTRACT 
 
Essay one examines the relationship between executive stock options and leverage and the 
interaction with institutional ownership.  Agency theory has held that options granted to 
executives should resolve some conflicts between managers and stockholders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976).  Yet recent events highlight the additional and perverse incentives that 
executive stock options can create. Prior research documents a positive contemporaneous 
relationship between options and leverage. I explicitly test for a causal relationship between 
these two.  I find that increases in executive options cause financial risk taking when there is low 
institutional ownership.  For high institutional ownership, I find that this is not the case.  Rather, 
following increases in leverage, managers are granted additional stock options to re-align 
incentives. 
 
Essay two examines the relationship between the structure of executive compensation and risk 
taking behavior in the banking industry.  First, it analyzes the relationship between managerial 
option compensation and bank capital-asset ratios.  Second, it analyzes whether the pay-for-risk 
incentive (Vega) created by executive stock options induces managers to increase other types of 
risk including credit risk, interest rate risk, operational risk and liquidity risk.  I find a consistent 
upward trend in Vega, and a consistent downward trend Delta.  I find that Delta is related to bank 
capital-asset ratios.  I also find that Vega is positively associated with measures of credit risk and 
negatively associated with measure of bank liquidity.  These results suggest bank managers 
respond to risk incentives created by option compensation.   
 
 vi
Essay three is an investigation of the profitability of a trading strategy which exploits the 
relationship between executive stock option grants and stock returns.  I suggest a method by 
which investors can take advantage of the return smile surrounding option grants.  I rely on SEC 
mandated, after-the-fact disclosures of option grant dates to identify a sub-sample of firms with 
fixed, annual option grant dates.  I take a short position in these firms' stocks just before the 
anticipated, but unobservable, option grant, and reverse that position immediately after the grant.  
The abnormal returns from this trading strategy are in excess of 2.5% over the 100-day holding 
period.   
 vii
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Executive Stock Options and Leverage: Perverse Incentives or Optimal Contracting? 
Essay One 
 
Introduction:  
"There has been a severance, in my judgment, of the interests of the chief executive officer in 
many corporations from those of the shareholders, and they should be pulled together.” 
Alan Greenspan (Congressional Testimony, February 27, 2002) 
 
 
“Some changes, however, appear overdue.  In principle, stock-option grants, properly 
constructed, can be highly effective in aligning corporate officers’ incentives with those of 
the shareholders.  Regrettably, the current accounting for options has created some perverse 
effects on the quality of corporate disclosures that, arguably, is further complicating the 
evaluation of earnings and hence diminishing the effectiveness of published income 
statements in supporting good corporate governance.” 
Alan Greenspan (Stern School of Business, March 26, 2002) 
 
 
“Designed to be a tool to link pay with performance, [stock options] have been awarded in 
such huge amounts that they've defeated their intent.” 
Senator Carl Levin (Testimony - Senate Finance Committee, April 18, 2002) 
 
 
 On the heels of the collapse of firms such as Enron, Qwest Communication, and Global 
Crossing, the incentives created by the use of stock options are being debated in the popular 
press and by legislators and regulators.  Managerial compensation contracts have long included 
stock option grants.  These options grants have the potential to reduce manager-stockholder 
agency conflicts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  Options can serve to align the incentives between 
managers and shareholders by making the manager an equity stakeholder in the firm. Yet, 
perversion of the managerial incentive to increase risk has brought increasing scrutiny to this 
type of managerial compensation.  This scrutiny is intensified because options granted to 
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executives have more than doubled in the 1990’s.  Furthermore, now at 36%, stock options are 
the single largest component of executive compensation, up from 27% at the beginning of the 
1990’s (Murphy, 1998).  Given the current levels of stock option grants, it has become 
increasingly important to understand the incentives created by this type of compensation 
mechanism. 
 A positive contemporaneous relationship between options and various measures of firm 
risk has been documented in the literature (e.g. Berger, Ofek, Yermack, 1997, and Rajgopal and 
Shevlin, 2002).  The purpose of this paper is to distinguish between two possible conclusions 
about a positive contemporaneous relationship and to add to the current debate about stock 
options, managerial incentives, and capital structure.  I contribute to the literatures by 
specifically testing the causality underlying the contemporaneous relationship between leverage 
and managerial stock options documented in prior research.  I seek to determine whether the use 
and granting of stock options leads managers to take on more financial leverage, or whether 
firms grant more executive stock options after leverage increases. Either of these two alternatives 
leads to the positive contemporaneous relationship documented previously. 
The Black-Scholes option pricing formula states that option value is monotonically 
increasing in the volatility of the stock. Given this relationship, the manager may choose actions 
that increase the riskiness of the stock to maximize the value of his stock options. Such actions 
would increase the manager’s personal utility while increasing the risk to the stockholders.  An 
increase in the firm’s use of leverage, a decision that is within the scope of managerial decision 
making authority, increases the volatility of the stock.  Berger, Ofek, and Yermack, 1997, 
(henceforth BOY) analyze capital structure and managerial equity holdings.  They document a 
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contemporaneous positive relationship between executive options and firm leverage1.  BOY 
conclude from this relationship that stock option grants create the incentive to increase firm 
leverage.  My paper relates to this study in that I empirically test to see if options granted to 
executives are actually followed by increases in leverage. 
Another possible conclusion about the positive contemporaneous relationship is that 
leverage increases are followed by option grants.  Choe (2003) develops a theory model around 
the relationships between leverage, volatility, and executive compensation contracts (which 
include options). One testable hypothesis of Choe's theoretical framework is that options grants 
are an increasing function of a firm's leverage, thus if a firm increases its leverage, the optimal 
compensation contract should adjust to include more options.  Intuitively, after an increase in 
leverage, risk-averse managers, desiring to reduce the risk exposure of their fixed compensation 
claim, can seek to offset the increase in leverage (financial risk) by choosing less risky projects 
(decrease in asset risk).  To prevent this, the optimal compensation contract adjusts to include 
more equity (stock options) thus making the manager more risk tolerant, consistent with Meyers’ 
(1977) asset substitution hypothesis.  If correct, Choe’s model would lead to the same empirical 
findings of BOY, a positive contemporaneous relationship between options and leverage. 
However, it would be the opposite conclusion of BOY.  Thus it is important to analyze the causal 
relationship underlying the positive contemporaneous relationship.   
I introduce an option measure which, to my knowledge, is unseen in the compensation 
literature.  I establish the validity of this measure by comparing the positive and significant 
contemporaneous relationship between options and leverage for my measure with the 
relationship documented by prior research.  I then make a unique contribution by explicitly 
                                                          
1 BOY (1997) note that of all the explanatory variables (stock holdings, CEO tenure, etc.) executive stock options is 
the most economically significant variable in the determination of the firm’s use of leverage. 
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testing for causal relationships between options and leverage, where prior literature simply 
assumes the existence and direction from the contemporaneous relationship.  I find moderate 
support for leverage causing options, and little support for options causing leverage. 
Institutional ownership plays an important role in both monitoring managerial actions 
and, through board influence, determining managerial compensation.  Therefore, I expect that the 
level of institutional ownership will have an important interaction with the two competing 
hypotheses.  To address this, I partition the sample on institutional ownership in order to analyze 
the effects of external monitoring on the causal relationships.   For low institutional ownership 
firms, I find that the causal relationship is from options to leverage.  Thus, in the presence of low 
institutional ownership (i.e., low monitoring) managers are free to act on their incentives to 
increase risk, created by stock options.  This finding is consistent with that of BOY (1997) who 
conclude that options induce managers to increase risk.  This result is in contrast with the result 
for firms with high institutional ownership.  High institutional ownership firms exhibit a causal 
relationship from leverage to options.  Following an increase in leverage, managers are granted 
additional stock options.  This result is consistent with an Contract response hypothesis and with 
the theoretic predictions of Choe (2003).   
These results highlight the importance of the role of institutional owners in this setting.  
The presence of institutional shareholders curtails the ability of managers to act on the risk 
incentives created by executive option grants and also makes managers’ compensation more 
equity based subsequent to leverage increases.  These findings are a departure from the current 
thoughts about stock options.  It indicates that, at least for some types of firms (high institutional 
ownership), stock-option grants do not cause excessive financial risk taking on the part of the 
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manager.  Rather, institutional shareholders use them efficiently to re-align managerial 
incentives after increases in leverage.   
This research is important because understanding the incentives of managers is useful in 
developing a complete theory of the firm.   Furthermore, given the current debate over the use of 
stock options, these results have implication for optimal compensation contracting and more 
generally for public policy.     
The paper is organized as follows.  Section II discusses the general agency conflict 
between managers and stockholders and presents the two competing hypotheses.   Section III 
discusses prior empirical research.  Section IV presents the data and methodology used in this 
study.  Section V presents empirical results that first establish construct validity of the alternative 
option measures and then presents the results of the Granger causality tests.  Section VI provides 
concluding remarks. 
 
Section I: The Competing Hypotheses 
A: Managerial Incentives Hypothesis 
This section briefly describes the theoretical and empirical work concerning managerial 
incentives and agency conflicts that accompany the separation of ownership and control.  
Seminal research in this area was done by Jensen and Meckling (1976).  They theorize that the 
costs associated with agency conflicts between managers and stockholders can be reduced if the 
manager’s compensation is related to the performance of the firm and the value of the firm's 
stock.  The manager has decision-making authority over project selection and also over the way 
in which those projects should be financed.  Managers may choose different capital structures or 
investment financing for a number of reasons.  Some of these are in the best interest of the 
 6
stockholders and some may only maximize the personal utility of the manager, at the expense of 
stockholders.   
Amihud and Lev (1981) argue that a manager will choose projects or financing that 
reduces the variability of a firm's earnings if the manager has a large amount of undiversifiable 
human capital i.e., the manager's skills are specific to the firm or the product produced by the 
firm.  Thus, should the firm fail, the manager with undiversified human capital would find it 
difficult to secure employment elsewhere.  This creates the incentive on the part of the manager 
to protect his human capital and choose low risk projects or capital structures.  Grossman and 
Hart (1982) recognize that the goals of managers and stockholders of the firm can be at odds, and 
the ability for the manager to consume perquisites or maximize personal utility creates the 
"incentive problem".  Grossman and Hart (1982) note that since debt increases the probability of 
bankruptcy, that it would not be in the interest of the manager to increase the use of leverage.  
However, Grossman and Hart (1982) ignore the incentives created by the choice of debt itself.      
 Managers who are given stock in the firm as part of their compensation package may be 
motivated to make decisions that are in the best interest of the shareholders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). When risky debt is in the capital structure of the firm, the equity can be viewed 
as a call option on the total assets of the firm with the strike price being the maturity value of the 
debt. At maturity of the debt the stockholders can either pay the bondholders the maturity payoff 
or let the "option" expire and default on the bonds and let the debt holders have the assets of the 
firm. This is in essence like exercising a call option if the asset is in the money or taking a zero 
payoff if the call option is out of the money. As is known from the Black Scholes equation, 
option value is increasing in the volatility of the underlying.  Therefore the manager who has 
been given equity in the firm and who is responsible for financial decisions can maximize the 
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value of his stock by increasing the volatility of the underlying asset (the total value of the firm). 
This argument is presented in detail in Jensen and Meckling (1976), but generally this action 
shifts wealth from the bondholders to the stockholders (and the manager). 
 Likewise, stock options create the incentive on the part of the manager to increase the 
volatility of the underlying asset, the stock. If there exists a capital structure where stock value is 
maximized, all else constant, the manager seeking to maximize his own utility may choose levels 
of leverage that exceed the stock-value maximizing level in order to increase the value of his 
options.  Thus option grants have the potential to induce increases in leverage.  This is the 
managerial incentives hypothesis and this hypothesis would be supported by evidence of Granger 
causality from options to leverage.   
B: Contract response hypothesis 
The contract response hypothesis suggests that compensation contracts need to adjust 
after changes in firm capital structure.  After a leverage increase, the managerial compensation 
contract should adjust to include more stock options.  The risk averse manager with a fixed 
compensation claim (salary) does not prefer the increased risk that the leverage increase brings.  
Thus, to compensate the manager for the additional risk and to prevent him from choosing less 
risky projects, the manager is granted options. Therefore, the Contract response hypothesis states 
that options grants are an increasing function of firm leverage.  This hypothesis is consistent with 
the theoretical predications of Choe (2003).  
Choe’s model contains two players, the manager who chooses between a risky and a risk 
free project, and the owner/shareholder who must issue debt in order to finance either project.  
Given distributional information about the risky project, the owner specifies a compensation 
contract to induce the desired behavior on the part of the manager.  Given risk neutral utility 
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functions and log normal distribution on the returns of the risky project the utility function of the 
manager reduces to the Black-Scholes value of a European call option with the exercise price 
equal to value of the debt plus the option strike price.  Comparative statics of this model indicate 
that, for a fixed exercise price, the size of the option grant for the optimal compensation contract 
is increasing in leverage.  The intuition of this result is that when the firm increases the debt of 
the firm, this in essence increases the exercise price of the manager's stock option, decreasing its 
value, both from a monetary and incentive standpoint.  Thus, after an increase in leverage, 
additional options need to be granted to the manager to increase his pay-for-performance 
sensitivity.  It is this testable hypothesis put forth by Choe, concerning the positive relationship 
between leverage and option grants, which is of interest for this paper.  
The goal of this work is to explicitly test for a causal relationship between options and 
leverage.  The managerial incentives hypothesis would be supported by evidence of Granger 
causality from options to leverage.  The Contract response hypothesis would be supported by 
evidence of Granger causality from leverage to options.  The primary goal of this paper is to test 
these two competing hypotheses. 
 
Section II: Related Literature 
This paper adds to literature that connects managerial compensation and managerial risk 
taking.  Theoretical work in this area suggests that causality should go in both directions.  
Empirical works test the relationship between executive option’s grants and stock volatility, asset 
risk, and leverage (financing risk).  However, these studies consider only unidirectional 
causality, from options to corporate risk taking.  Furthermore, the causality underlying the 
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relationship between stock options and firm leverage has not been analyzed.  I contribute to the 
literature by specifically testing for bi-directional causality.  
Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) analyze the effect of compensation contracts on stock 
volatility around the announcement of acquisitions and divestitures. Specifically, Agrawal and 
Mandelker estimate pre and post announcement variance of firm returns, then categorize firms as 
either variance increasing or variance decreasing.  They find that firms that have increased post-
announcement variance also have managers with much larger equity holdings. They conclude 
that their findings are consistent with the notion that managerial equity stakes have an effect on 
agency problems. Agrawal and Mandelker examine only stock and options together, and do not 
analyze ESOs separately.  The value of stock and stock options react differently to increases in 
leverage and volatility, thus it is important to disaggregate the two.  Also, given that the current 
policy debate concerns only stock options, studying options separately is needed if the research 
is to add to that debate. 
DeFusco, Johnson, and Zorn (1990) analyze implied volatility around announcements of 
ESO increase or adoption for the executive officers.  They find that the announcement that the 
firm is adopting or increasing their use of ESOs is followed by a statistically significant increase 
in implied volatility. This result is in strong support of the notion that managers will take actions 
to increase volatility if given a greater number of stock options, ceteris paribus.  This paper 
addresses the view of market participants but does not suggest the specific actions of the 
manager that effect the change in volatility.  
BOY (1997) examine managerial entrenchment and its effect on capital structure. They 
find a significant contemporaneous relationship between managerial stock options and leverage 
and conclude that option grants lead to increases in leverage.  Their stock option measure is 
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collected from annual report footnotes and is the number of CEO stock options that are 
exercisable within 60-days of the annual report’s publication. In the sample design BOY choose 
434 firms from the Forbes list of the top 500 largest U.S. firms. Given they limit their sample to 
large firms, they concede that the results of their study may not generalize to firms of different 
size2.  While this paper considers financing risk, they suggest that causality is in one direction 
and do not address causality from leverage to options.  This latter direction of causality is also 
consistent with their contemporaneous results.   
Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, (2003) test the effect of vega (pay-for-risk sensitivity) on a 
firm’s investment policies and debt policies.  Specifically they find that higher prior vega is 
associated with higher investment in R&D and less investment in property, plant and equipment.  
Furthermore, higher prior vega is associated with decreased cash holdings, fewer lines of 
business, and higher leverage.  This last point provides strong support for the managerial 
incentives hypothesis, at least for S&P1500 firms.  I also directly test the managerial incentives 
hypothesis using a much broader cross section of firms.  This allows the results to be generalized 
beyond large firms in the S&P1500.  I also test the competing contract response hypothesis.  
Rajgopal and Shevlin (2000) examine executive stock options in a sample of oil and gas 
companies.  They find that ESOs motivate managers to take on additional exploration risk, as 
measured by the variance of future operating cash flows from exploration activity.  This action 
                                                          
2 Another limitation of their study is that their measure includes only options that are exercisable within the next 60 
days.  Research done by Huddart and Lang (1996) examines the policies of eight firms who use ESO as a means of 
compensation. The number of years for ESO vesting in their sample is between three and five years (note that 
options are not exercisable unless vested).  Kole (1997) finds that of the 371 Fortune 500 firms she analyzed, 100 
percent grant options at the money and 99 percent grant options with ten years to maturity. Therefore, choosing a 
measure of stock options that accounts for only options exercisable within the next 60 days underestimates the true 
number of options granted. Combining the implications from the two studies previously cited, the measure chosen 
by Berger et al. would underestimate the number of options by approximately 50 percent. Furthermore, options with 
longer times to maturity will be more responsive to changes in stock volatility. This fact further increases the 
amount of executive wealth that will be created as volatility is increased. Therefore, the measure used by Berger et 
al. is inaccurate and is also subject to more variable noise than a measure that can capture all managerial ESO 
holdings. I address this issue in Section 4.1 in Data and Methodology. 
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can be seen as managers seeking to change asset risk.  Furthermore, managers with stock options 
reduce reserve hedging activities.  Using Black-Scholes values they calculate the mean risk 
incentive for the CEO to be $34,260.  Thus for every one percent increase in stock return 
volatility a CEO’s dollar wealth increase by $34,260.  Similarly, Guay (1999) measures the 
sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock risk and reports a means sensitivity of $29,893.  These 
numbers can be compared to the Jensen and Murphy (1990) finding that CEO wealth increases 
by only $3.25 per $1,000 increase in shareholder wealth.   For a manager to affect the same 
increase in his personal wealth as results from a one percent volatility increase, the manager 
would need to create $11 million in shareholder wealth3.  These figures quantify the incentives 
created by granting decision-making authority over assets and financing (capital structure) to the 
manager who holds stock options.   
Williams and Rao (2000) look at M&A activity and find that firms with joint increases in 
stock volatility and leverage subsequent to mergers have manager stock options that are more 
sensitive to changes in volatility.  This is consistent with managers using M&A activity to affect 
an increase in leverage and/or volatility to maximize their own option value.   
Holmström (1979) and Holmström and Milgrom (1987) suggest that pay-for-performance 
sensitivity should be decreasing in the variance of the firm’s returns.  That is to say, the equity 
part of managerial compensation should be decreasing in the noise of the signal or firm returns.  
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) test the empirical relationship between pay-for-performance 
sensitivity and firm risk and find confirmation of the principal-agent theory prediction that pay-
for-performance sensitivity is decreasing in the variance of the firm’s performance.   However, 
as discussed by Core and Guay (2001), many restrictive assumptions are employed to test the 
Holmström and Milgrom (1987) theory.  The first assumption is that managerial actions only 
                                                          
3 (34,260/3.25)*1000=$10,541,538 
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affect the first moment of the returns distribution.  Hence, managers can choose projects and 
financing that affect mean performance but not the variance of performance (returns).  In light of 
recent research on risk incentives (Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2000), this assumption is unlikely to 
hold.   
 Smith and Watts (1992) use Conference Board survey data to analyze the effects of 
executive compensation packages on the capital structure and dividend policy of the firm. Their 
results suggest that ESOs decrease the amount of leverage chosen by executives. This result is 
contrary to the results of Berger et al., DeFusco et al., and Agrawal and Mandelker. One reason 
could be that the data used by Smith and Watts is industry level data and is collected only every 
four years by the Conference Board.  Considering these restrictions and the fact that the ESO 
measure is an indicator variable suggests that further empirical study is required to understand 
the relationship between ESOs and leverage.  Moreover, with the executive option measure that I 
introduce to the literature in this study, I am able to examine a much larger cross section of firms, 
thus the results should be more generalizable. 
Hartzell and Starks (2002) find that institutional ownership levels are positively related 
with pay-performance sensitivity.  The sophistication of institutional investor may explain this 
finding.  Institutional investors may better understand pay-for-performance sensitivity and also 
have the ability to influence compensation committees by petitioning that managerial 
compensation be subject to more (less) pay-for-performance sensitivity after an increase 
(decrease) in leverage.  Thus it is likely that there is a relationship between institutional 
ownership and optimal contracting.  Furthermore, since institutional investors serve as monitors 
on managerial actions, the presence of institutional investors may decrease the ability of the 
manager to act on any perverse risk incentives created by granting the managers stock options.   
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Therefore institutional ownership may have a limiting effect on the causal relationship from 
options to leverage.  To address this issue, I partition my sample and analyze causality for low 
and high institutional ownership sub-samples.   
 
Section III: Data and Methodology 
A: Definition of Executive Stock Option Measure 
 In constructing the data for this empirical study, I chose data that can potentially correct 
for many of the shortcomings of previous empirical research. I use 15 years of annual data from 
Compustat (1983 to 1997). During this time Compustat collected data item #215, common shares 
reserved for the exercise of stock options granted. This item is on record for years 1984 through 
1995. This off-balance sheet account is the number of shares reserved for the purpose of ESO 
exercise by employees. It is a measure of the total number of stock options granted by the firm, 
vested and non-vested, exercisable and non-exercisable4.  Since this measure captures all options 
granted to a manager, this measure thus may correct for the limitation of BOY’s measure which 
captures only those options exercisable within the next 60 days.  
The measure of ESOs used in this study is for all employees, not only the CEO or other 
corporate managers.  It includes stock options granted to non-executives who, obviously, do not 
have strong ability to affect capital structure changes.  Furthermore, a study by Huddart and 
Lang (1996) shows that the employee stock option programs of NYSE firms do not extend deep 
within the firm. Thus even if firms have employee stock option plans, it is the firm managers 
who receive the majority of the option grants. They studied the ESO plans for eight firms, four of 
which were on the NYSE, three on the NASDAQ, and one private.  Descriptive statistics for 
                                                          
4 This measure is defined by Compustat as representing shares reserved for stock options outstanding as of yearend 
plus options that are available for future grants.   
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these eight firms are reproduced in Table 1.  As can be seen in Table 1, only a very small number 
of employees are compensated with ESOs in the NYSE firms while the NASDAQ firms grant 
options on a more equal basis with approximately half of the employees in the three NASDAQ 
firms receiving options. Also, there is a large difference between the average number of ESOs an 
employee is granted and the maximum number of options granted to a single employee.5 
 Most previous empirical studies use Standard and Poor's ExecuComp database. This 
database includes data for the S&P 500, S&P Mid Cap 400, and S&P Small Cap 600 firms. This 
database contains executive compensation data including salaries, bonuses, stock, and stock 
options. Since the incentive effects from executive option programs are of primary interest and 
since not all S&P 1500 have ESO programs, the number of firms within an ExecuComp sample 
would be well below 1500. Current SEC disclosure requirements mandate only that firms 
disclose options that are in or at the money.  Garvey and Mawani (2000) using a sample of 
Canadian firms (Ontario Security Commission requires that all options be disclosed) note that 
33.4% of the option grants are out of the money.  Thus using the Execucomp data may 
understate the true number of options granted to managers.  The option measure used in this 
paper has a number of advantages. First, the measure is available for a broader cross section of 
firms.  This measure is available for approximately six thousand firms per year as opposed to 
less than one thousand firms in Execucomp.  Second, this measure captures all options granted to 
managers, not just those that are in the money.  Third, since the measure also accounts for 
options that are available for future option grants, this measure may more accurately reflect the 
number of options that the manager accounts for in his decision making process.   
                                                          
5 Prior literature has shown that the CEO receives the maximum number of ESOs or at least a number of the same 
magnitude).    
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 Weisbrenner (2000) examines effects of options on corporate payout policy. He uses 
annual statements to obtain CEO and manager holding and uses Compustat data item #215 to 
measure employee options.  He notes that the correlation between the two measures in his 
sample is 0.6. This is strong justification for the use of the option measure.  Since I assume that 
non-managerial employees have no control over capital structure decisions, the uncorrelated 
variation in employee options is assumed to be random, and thus would bias against finding 
significant results.    
B: Sample Selection: Contemporaneous Relationship  
I use all available firms from the Compustat data tapes from 1983-1997.6 This includes 
data for over 21,000 firms across 15 years, yielding 316,935 firm year observations.  The 
dependent variable is total debt to total assets (book value) (LEV). I use percent of ESOs, PESO, 
as the independent variable, which is the number of ESOs granted divided by the total number of 
common shares outstanding.7  Typical capital structure control variables are used in this study.  
The log of total assets (LNTA) controls for size.  Firms with higher profitability are likely to have 
more access to internal capital.  Therefore, return-on-assets (ROA), calculated as EBIT divided 
by total assets, is included as a control for profitability.   Growth opportunities (GROW), 
calculated as R&D expense divided by total sales are included to control for those assets that add 
value to a firm but can not be collateralized.  It is expected that this growth opportunities are 
negatively related to leverage.  Firms that operate in relatively unique industries will tend to face 
higher liquidation costs.  Furthermore, firms that operate in unique industries may be more 
opaque increasing the agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and control.  
This increases the need for equity based compensation to align incentives.  Thus I also include an 
                                                          
6 Data Item 215 is available for the 12 years from 1984 to 1995.  However, I obtain leverage data prior to and after 
this time period.  
7 Berger et al. (1997) and Yermack (1995) also divide their option measure by common shares outstanding.   
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asset uniqueness variable (AssetU) employed by Titman and Wessels (1988).  This variable is 
expected to be negatively related to the level leverage.  Asset collateral value (ACOLLAT), 
calculated as (PPE + inventory)/total assets, is used as a control.  A large number of 
collateralizable assets would protect creditors in the event of bankruptcy, thus creditor will be 
more willing to lend.  Thus asset collateral value is expected to be positively related to leverage.   
After the intersection of all required variables, the sample contains 58,158 observations. 
As Table 2 indicates, the number of firm observations is distributed evenly over the 12 years, 
with an approximate 1% average annual growth in the level of options granted (PESO).   
Following Smith and Watts (1992), I control for industry specific factors. These are 
based upon SIC codes and detailed in Table 3. 
The descriptive statistics in Table 4 show that capital structure and option grants vary 
substantially across industries.  Tobacco has an average of 9 million options granted while textile 
companies have only 716,000 granted.  This measure does not account for the number of shares 
that a firm has outstanding.  PESO is the number of options granted divided by the number of 
common shares, and thus represents percentage of the firm granted to the manager in the form of 
options.  On a percentage basis, the distribution is much tighter with .13 (13%) being the 
maximum (Instrumentation) and .06 (6%) (Mining) being the minimum.   
 Book value of debt-to-total assets is the dependent variable.  Table 4 displays this 
leverage ratio.  Any firm with a leverage ratio in excess of 2.0 is removed from the sample.  A 
leverage ratio exceeding 1.0 indicates negative book value of equity, and hence taken as 
justification for the deletion from the sample. 
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C: Sample Selection: Causal Relationship 
The causality tests include the variables used in documenting the contemporaneous 
relationship as well as additional information on institutional ownership.  Since I hypothesize 
that the degree of institutional ownership will affect the causal relationship between leverage and 
options, I include percent institutional ownership (PCTOWN).  This variable is obtained from 
SEC 13-F filings, made available through Thompson/CDA. 
D: Methodology: Contemporaneous Relationship 
 To establish validity of the option measure, the contemporaneous relationship between 
options and leverage is analyzed using models similar to those of prior research.8  OLS 
estimation is used to measure the effect of executive stock options (PESO) on the choice of a 
firm’s capital structure (LEV), controlling for year effects, industry (Mining, Tobacco, etc.), 
profitability (ROA). Control variables for firm assets include growth options (Grow), asset 
uniqueness (AssetU), and asset collateral value (ACOLLAT).  TAX is a control for non-interest 
tax shields. The basic pooled regression equation is as follows: 
 
LEVi,t = f(PESOi,t ROAi,t LnTAi,t assetsi,t Growi,t TAXi,t,industryi yeart ) 
where i denotes firmi and t denotes yeart.     
 
E: Methodology:  Causal Relationships 
To test for a unidirectional relationship, the Granger Causality test is employed following the 
model of Granger (1969).  Testing causality consists of testing the following two conditions.     
                                                          
8 BOY control for executive stock holdings, which is unavailable in the Compustat data. 
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Condition 1: 
( ) ( )Γ=Γ −−− ,,, sttststt LEVLEVfPESOLEVLEVf  
Condition 2; 
( ) ( )Γ=Γ −−− ,,, sttststt PESOPESOfLEVPESOPESOf  
 
In the conditions above, Γ is the vector of control variables that are assumed to have explanatory 
power for LEVt.  The subscript s indicates that number of lagged variables (1 to n) that are 
included in the model specifications.  Condition 1 states that the function determining current 
leverage (LEVt) when lagged values of PESO are included is identical to the function that omits 
lagged values of PESO.  In other words, lagged values of PESO add no explanatory power to the 
model over the explanatory power of the model that does not include lagged values of PESO.  
Condition 2 states that lagged values of LEV add no explanatory power to PESO over lagged 
values of PESO and the Γ vector of controls.  Thus the model determining PESOt is unchanged 
by the inclusion or exclusion of lagged values of leverage.  To establish a unidirectional 
relationship one condition must be rejected while the other is not rejected.  For example, to 
establish a unidirectional relationship from options to leverage will consist of not rejecting 
Condition 1 while rejecting Condition 2.  That is to say that options cause leverage, but leverage 
does not cause options.    
Each condition is tested using OLS estimation.  The model is specified in terms of 
changes in leverage and changes in option grants9.  To test Condition 1, the model is estimated 
with ΔLEV as the dependent variable with lagged ΔLEV, lagged ΔPESO, and lagged control 
variable vector, Γ, as independent variables: 
                                                          
9 LEV, the level of leverage, is also included as a right hand side variable (results not shown).  The results obtained 
are qualitatively similar.   
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Theory does not directly suggest the length of lags (m) that should be included, nor do the lags 
for ΔLEV or ΔPESO need to be the same length.  When testing for Granger causality on long 
time series of significant lengths, the optimal number of lags can be determined using Akaike's 
Information Criterion (AIC).  However, each additional lag length added to the model 
substantially reduces the data set when using panel data.   The average number of observations 
per firm in the data set is 6, thus the number of lags, m, is limited to two.    
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Additionally, it is necessary to ensure that the causality results are not lag length specific.  To 
address this issue, causality tests with a lag length of one and lag length of two are performed.  
Although only the results for a lag length of one are presented, the results for a lag length of two 
are qualitatively similar.   
 The test of Condition 2 consists of the estimation of the following regression equation: 
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Section IV:  Empirical Results 
A: Contemporaneous Relationship 
The main goal of this section is to establish the option measure as a valid measure of 
executive stock options.  Thus empirical models are similar to those used in prior research10. 
Table 5 presents the least squares estimation results for the contemporaneous 
relationship.  Following prior empirical work, all models have leverage (LEV) as the dependent 
variable.  In Model (1) the coefficient on lnTA (log of total assets) (0.0224) is positive and 
significant, indicating that larger firms tend to use more leverage.  This result is driven by the 
fact that larger firms tend to be more diversified and have better access to the public debt market 
than do smaller firms.  The coefficient on ROA (-0.0952) indicates that firms with higher 
profitability rely less on debt.  Firms with higher profitability have greater free cash flows and 
thus more funds are being generated internally.  Consistent with Meyers and Majluf’s (1984) 
pecking order of funds, greater free cash flow mitigates the need to rely on any type of outside 
funding, including debt. 
Models (2-6) in Table 5 include firm fixed effects.   The coefficients on the year 
dummies suggest that firms tend to increase their use of leverage over the sample period.  With 
fixed firm effects, the negative coefficient on ROA (-0.0822) indicates that as ROA for a firm 
increases the firm relies less on debt financing.   
Models (2) through (6), each including different control variables, have positive and 
significant coefficients on PESO.11  Thus the overall contemporaneous positive relationship 
between options and leverage is robust to the model specifications presented in Table 5.  The 
                                                          
10 The results presented here can be compared to prior research (i.e. BOY, 1997). 
11 Model (3) includes the asset collateral value (ACOLLAT) variable.  The coefficient on ACOLLAT (.2962) 
indicates that firms with assets that have higher collateral value obtain more debt financing.  Higher collateral value 
reduces the risk of the debt and thus the cost of the debt, making it a relatively more attractive source of external 
financing 
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positive contemporaneous result is also robust to estimation method12.  Appendix 1 displays 
results for the Random Coefficients model put forth by Hildreth and Houck (1968).   
These positive contemporaneous results are consistent with the results found by prior 
studies of BOY (1997), DeFusco et al.(1990) and Agrawal and Mendelker (1987).  The results of 
this section, taken as a whole, demonstrate the validity of the PESO option measure and are 
taken as justification for the use of the PESO option measure in the tests for unidirectional 
causality.   
B: Granger Causality Results 
This section presents results that reveal causal relationships between options and 
leverage.  The methodology is that of Granger (1969).  Two hypotheses are being tested in this 
section, the managerial incentives hypothesis and the Contract response hypothesis.  The 
managerial incentives hypothesis will be supported if there exists causality from changes in 
options to changes in firm leverage, while the Contract response hypothesis will be supported if 
there exists causality from changes in leverage to changes in option grants. The results for the 
causality tests are presented in Table 6.  The models presented here are for the change model 
with one lag.   
 Panel 1 presents models that test for a relationship from options to leverage.  Change in 
leverage (ΔLEVt) is the dependent variable in all 4 models.  Models (1) through (4) contain 
different elements of the Γ control variable vector.  Lagged changes in options (ΔPESOt-1) and 
lagged changes in leverage (ΔLEVt-1) appear as independent variables.  If the managerial 
incentives hypothesis holds and options Granger cause leverage then the coefficient on ΔPESOt-1 
should test positive and significant.  In Panel 1, all four models have coefficients on ΔPESOt-1 
                                                          
12 Appendix 1 of the working paper displays results for the Random Coefficients model put forth by Hildreth and 
Houck (1968) 
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that are positive, but all are statistically insignificant.  Thus my results do not support the 
managerial incentive hypothesis.  Although the results of the previous section indicate a positive 
contemporaneous relationship between options and leverage, I do not find support for the 
conclusions made by prior research concerning the causality of that contemporaneous 
relationship.   
 Panel 2, Table 6, presents results for tests of causality flowing from changes in leverage 
to changes in options.  If the Contract response hypothesis holds and changes in leverage 
Granger cause changes in options, then the coefficient on ΔLEVt-1 will be positive and 
significant.  Model (2) documents a positive and significant causal relationship from leverage to 
options. The coefficient on ΔLEVt-1 is 0.0120 (t=2.52) and is significant at a 95% confidence 
level.  The other three models all have positive coefficients, but are not statistically significant.  
Therefore, at least for the entire sample, I find only weak support for the Contract response 
hypothesis that increases in leverage are followed by increases in option grants13.  
Although the results for the entire sample only support a significant causal relationship 
from leverage to options, sub-samples partitioned on size (market equity value) and partitioned 
on institutional ownership do suggest stronger and unidirectional causality.  The sample is 
partitioned first based upon market value of firm equity.  The median MVE for the entire sample 
is $71.1 million.  All firms having MVE greater than the median are included in the upper sub-
sample (denoted U) while those with MVE less than the median are included in the lower sub-
sample (denoted L).  Secondly, the sample is partitioned based upon institutional ownership.  
The median percentage of institutional ownership, PCTOWN, is 20.1%.  Firms are classified into 
                                                          
13 The models in Panel 1 of Table 6 were replicated limiting the data to only those firms contained within the 
S&P1500 (Execucomp firms).  This is done as a check of the Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2003) results.  When the 
sample is limited to S&P1500, I find that prior increases in options are associated with leverage increases.  This 
supports the managerial incentives hypothesis and the results of Coles, Daniel, and Naveen.   
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upper sub-sample (institutional ownership > 20.1%) and a lower sub-sample (institutional 
ownership < 20.1%).  Table 7 presents descriptive statistics on the sub-samples of the two 
partitions.  The sub-samples are combined and SUR estimation is used.  This estimation method 
allows testing for significant differences between the coefficients of the upper and lower sub-
samples.  For the sake of parsimony, only the coefficients on the variables of interest for 
causality are reported. 
 Panel 1 of Table 8 displays the regression results for the test of causality from options to 
leverage.  The dependent variable is change in leverage (from time t-1 to t), ΔLEVt, and the 
independent variable is lagged change in options (from time t-2 to time t-1) ΔPESOt-1.  Looking 
first at model (4), the coefficients indicate no significant relationship for the high MVE firms, 
but a positive (0.0729) and significant (t=1.78) relationship at the 90% level for low MVE firms.  
The F-statistic does not indicate a significant difference between these two coefficients.  The 
coefficients and F-statistics in the other three are insignificant.  These results are little support for 
the managerial incentives hypothesis.   
Panel 2 of Table 8 displays results for testing the causal relationship from leverage to 
options.  The coefficients of interest are ΔLEV-U and ΔLEV-L and the difference between the 
two indicates different causal relationships between the two sub-samples.  In Model (1) lagged 
changes in leverage for the upper sample (ΔLEV-U = .0185) is positive and significant (t=2.91) 
while the coefficient for the lower samples (ΔLEV-L = -.0001) is not significant (t=0.03).  
Models (2)-(4) display similar results.  Therefore, for larger firms, changes in leverage at time t-1 
affect changes in options at time t.  Furthermore, the F-statistic test indicates that the coefficients, 
ΔLEV-U and ΔLEV-L, are statistically different from each other.  These results suggest that 
firms of different size exhibit different causal relationships. This underscores the importance of 
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the broad cross section of firms provided by this option measure.  Furthermore, since the firms in 
the Execucomp database tend to be larger firms, this suggests limited ability to generalize results 
based upon the Execucomp measure. 
Combining the results of Panel 2 with those from Panel 1 provides strong evidence that 
leverage Granger causes options, for at least a sub-sample, but that there is little evidence that 
options Granger cause leverage.  These results support the Contract response hypothesis and the 
empirical predictions of Choe (2003) and do not support the managerial incentives hypothesis. 
Table 9 displays the results when the sample is partitioned based upon institutional 
ownership.  Distinguishing between high and low institutional ownership is important since 
monitoring by institutional owners is likely to reduce the ability of managers to act on any 
perverse incentives created by options.  Hartzell and Starks (2002) show that pay for 
performance sensitivity is positively associated with institutional ownership.  Furthermore, the 
sophistication of institutional owners may imply better contracting.  To address these issues the 
sample is partitioned on institutional ownership.  Similar to the size partition, causality results 
are obtained for both the upper and lower institutional ownership sub-samples and the difference 
between the two is tested using the F-statistic.   
Panel 1 displays results testing Granger causality from options to leverage.  In Model (1), 
ΔPESO-U is negative (-.0068) and insignificant (t = 0.51) while ΔPESO-L is positive (.0284) 
and significant (t = 1.92) at the 90% confidence levels.  The F-test indicates that the difference 
between ΔPESO-U and ΔPESO-L is significant at the 90% confidence level.  This is evidence 
that changes in options do cause changes in leverage, but only in firms with low intuitional 
ownership.  Models (3) and (4) show similar results.  The coefficients on ΔPESO-L are 0.0458 
(t=1.95) and 0.9484 (t=2.38), respectively.  These coefficients are significantly different from the 
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ΔPESO-U coefficients, as indicated by the F-statistics.  These results suggest that in the presence 
of low institutional ownership, and presumably low monitoring, managers may be able to act on 
the risk incentives created by options and thus increases in option grants are followed by 
increases in leverage.  These results are strong supporting evidence for the managerial incentive 
hypothesis and are also consistent with Hartzell and Starks (2002) who note that institutional 
investors may seek to curtail excess compensation being paid to managers.  
Panel 2, Table 9 displays the results testing a casual relationship from leverage to options, 
partitioning on institutional ownership.  In model (1) the coefficient on ΔLEV-U is positive 
(.0199) and significant (t = 2.99) while the coefficient for the low institutional ownership sample, 
ΔLEV-L, is positive (.0006) but insignificant (t = .14).  Therefore, changes in leverage have a 
positive effect on subsequent changes in option grants, and this relationship is significant for 
firms with high institutional ownership.  Furthermore, the relationship between leverage changes 
and option changes is different for high institutional ownership firms and low institutional 
ownership firms, as indicated by the F-statistic, significant at the 95% confidence level.     
All models presented in Panel 2, Table 9, indicate that changes in leverage Granger cause 
changes in option grants, but only for firms with high institutional ownership.  This supports the 
Contract response hypothesis and supports the empirical prediction of Choe (2003).  If 
institutional owners are sophisticated investors that can influence corporate decision-making, 
they may encourage compensation committees to increase managerial pay-for-performance 
sensitivity after a leverage increase, consistent with optimal compensation contracting. 
The overall results for the institutional ownership partitions provide insight into the 
causal relationship between firm leverage and executive stock options.  These results are tests for 
causality where prior research only assumes causality from the contemporaneous relationship.  
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These results demonstrate that the relationship is not a simple one, and that other factors, size 
and institutional ownership specifically, interact non-linearly with the causal relationships 
between options and leverage. 
 
Section V:  Conclusions 
This paper investigates the causal relationship between executive stock options and the 
proportional use of debt. Using a large sample and an alternative option measure, I find minimal 
support for the notion that increases (decreases) in executive options lead to increases 
(decreases) in leverage.  In a sub-sample of firms, partitioned on institutional ownership, my 
results support a causal relationship for firms with low institutional ownership while the results 
do not support the causal relationship for firms with high levels of institutional ownership.  This 
result supports the managerial incentive hypothesis that managers will act on the incentive to 
increase firm leverage when granted stock options.  The fact that this causal relationship exists 
when institutional ownership is low adds strength to the managerial incentives hypothesis.     
My results strongly support the Contract response hypothesis which suggests that 
changes in leverage are followed by changes in option grants. Granger causality is found from 
leverage to options for firms with high institutional ownership.  This can be interpreted as 
institutional owners influencing compensation committees to implement the new, optimal 
managerial compensation contract, following a change in firm leverage.  These results support 
the empirical prediction of Choe (2003).   
The results in this paper underscore the importance of understanding the causality 
underlying the positive contemporaneous relationship between options and leverage documented 
previously in the literature. 
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This paper adds to the existing body of research in a number of ways.  First, it supports 
the contemporaneous relationship between options and leverage documented in the prior 
literature.  Furthermore, this paper sheds light on the assumptions made about causality between 
options and leverage and concludes that the relationship between executive stock options and 
firm capital structure is more complex than previously thought.  This last point adds to the 
current policy debate over the expensing of stock options currently before Congress.  Blamed for 
possible contribution of the collapse of firms such as Enron, World Com, and Global Crossing, 
stock options have drawn much criticism from legislators and from the popular press.  Senator 
Carl Levin (D., Mich.) has introduced a bill that will rein in the use of options by requiring that 
firms expense the value of the stock options as they currently do for other forms of 
compensation.  While this solution reduces the perverse incentives created by stock options, it 
does so only by essentially limiting the grants all together, thereby also reducing any positive 
effects of executive stock options.  The results presented in this paper suggest that the market has 
in place a tool to control the perverse managerial incentives created by the use of stock options 
while still gaining the benefits as a form of compensation.  In the presence of high level of 
institutional ownership, the managerial risk incentive appears to be curtailed.   Hence, this free 
market solution does not artificially constrain a firm's use of stock options as a form of 
compensation, as would the pending legislation. 
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Table 1 
Huddart and Lang Journal of Accounting and Economics, 21 (1996) 5-43 
Employee Stock Option Exercise: An Empirical Analysis 
 
Firm A B C D E F G H
Industry Diversified Electronics Financial Financial Computer Computer Computer Service
Market Capitalization >$10B >$10B >$1-10B >$1-10B <$1B <$1B <$1B <$1B
Exchange NYSE NYSE NYSE NYSE NASDAQ NASDAQ NASDAQ NASDAQ
Number of options:
Mean 1301 297 2626 2327 4348 2626 1300 1204
Median 500 175 1696 1225 1500 1800 379 500
Max (CEO presumably) 65,000 65,000 62,200 80,000 120,000 150,000 300,000 400,000
22.80%1.10% 9.20% 0.80% 1.80%Percent of employees who 
receive options
32.40% 55.20% 70.20%
 
 
This table is reproduced from Huddart and Lang (1996) and displays characteristics from the employee stock option 
plans of eight firms.   
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Table 2 
Employee Stock Option Programs 
 
Yr95 Yr94 Yr93 Yr92 Yr91 Yr90 Yr89 Yr88 Yr87 Yr86 Yr85 Yr84
ESO (observation per year) 5470 6439 6261 5695 5658 5517 5532 5665 5869 5888 5640 5305
PESO (average annual ESO 
grant as a percentage of shares 
outstanding)
12.77% 12.93% 11.45% 11.99% 11.05% 10.83% 9.43% 8.66% 8.21% 7.98% 7.56% 7.02%
 
 
1 This table displays descriptive statistics for the option measure used in this study.   
2 ESO (observations per year) is the number of firms in each given year that contain information on option grants 
from the Compustat tapes, data item #215 (shares of stock reserved for conversion of employee options). 
3 PESO is the number of options granted (item #215) divided by the number of shares outstanding. 
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Table 3 
Industry Definitions 
 
Industry SIC variable name firm-observations
Mining 1000-1500 mining 5623
Construction 1600-1800 construct 510
Tobacco Products 2100-2200 tobacco 75
Textile Mill Products 2200-2400 textmill 1413
Lumber and Wood Products 2400-2700 wood 1942
Chemical & Rubber Products 2800-3100 chemical 6318
Primary Metal Industries 3300-3500 metal 2781
Industrial Machinery and Equipment 3500-3700 equip 10865
Transportation Equipment 3700-3800 transM 1607
Instrumentation Products 3800-3900 instr 4970
Transportation 4000-4800 transp 2070
Communications 4800-4900 commun 2524
Wholesale Trade 5000-5200 wholetrade 3800
Retail Trade 5200-6000 retailtrade 5479
Business Services 7300-7500 bussvc 6267
All Other un-classified else Nonclass 12972  
 
1Table 3 displays the industry classifications used in this study as well as the SIC codes used to identify 
observations.   
2Variable name is the name of the industry as they are presented in the results tables. 
3This is the total number of firm-year observation within a given industry for the entire sample.  The sample spans 
the years from 1985 to 1995. 
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics by Industry 
 
Industry SIC Variable Name PESO ESO LEV
Mining 1000-1500 mining 0.059 1.595 0.45
N=5623 (0.134) (19.833) (0.329)
Transportation 4000-4800 transp 0.061 0.797 0.653
N=2070 (0.171) (2.085) (0.261)
Transportation Equipment 3700-3800 transM (0.062 2.003 0.637
N=1607 (0.087) (4.895) (0.264)
Tobacco Products 2100-2200 tobacco 0.064 8.568 0.665
N=75 (0.058) (14.027) (0.325)
Primary Metal Industries 3300-3500 metal 0.068 0.845 0.597
N=2781 (0.127) (2.091) (0.270)
Communications 4800-4900 commun 0.068 1.823 0.662
N=2524 (0.180) (5.459) (0.319)
Lumber and Wood Products 2400-2700 wood 0.071 1.03 0.564
N=1942 (0.138) (2.407) (0.259)
Textile Mill Products 2200-2400 textmill 0.08 0.716 0.581
N=1413 (0.143) (1.125) (0.263)
Wholesale Trade 5000-5200 wholetrade 0.086 0.859 0.598
N=3800 (0.140) (3.954) (0.279)
Construction 1600-1800 construct 0.087 1.343 0.584
N=510 (0.193) (15.500) (0.284)
Retail Trade 5200-6000 retailtrade 0.087 1.413 0.601
N=5479 (0.156) (3.868) (0.275)
All Other un-classified else Nonclass 0.095 1.529 0.58
N=12972 (0.200) (19.077) (0.311)
Chemical & Rubber Products 2800-3100 chemical 0.116 2.311 0.484
N=6318 (0.244) (10.295) (0.308)
Industrial Machinery and Equipment 3500-3700 equip 0.125 1.575 0.518
N=10865 (0.219) (8.258) (0.298)
Instrumentation Products 3800-3900 instr 0.13 1.047 0.458
N=4970 (0.225) (4.658) (0.302)
Business Services 7300-7500 bussvc 0.153 1.688 0.528
N=6267 (0.272) (5.961) (0.324)  
 
1 This table displays descriptive statistics for options and leverage by industry classification.   
2ESO is the firm-year mean number of options, in millions of shares, granted to employees within a given industry.  
ESO is taken from the Compustat tapes as data item #215 and averaged across firms and years, within industries.    
3PESO is the firm-year average number of options granted (item #215) divided by the number of shares outstanding. 
4LEV is debt-to-total assets (book value) averaged across firm-years within industry classification.  The numbers 
presented are after deletion of all firms with LEV in excess of 2.0. 
5N is the number of firm-year observations in any given industry classification. 
6Sample standard deviations appear in parentheses.  
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Table 5 
Cross Sectional Regression Results:  
Contemporaneous Relationship between Options and Leverage 
 
Models: 
LEVjt = α0 + Σ10 α86-95 + α1PESOjt + α2ROAjt + α3lnTAjt + εjt        (1) 
LEVjt = Σ10 α86-1995 +Σk αk1-kXX + α1PESOjt + α2ROAjt +α3lnTAjt + εjt      (2) 
LEVjt = Σ10 α1986-1995 +Σk αk1-kXX + α1PESOjt + α2ROAjt + α3lnTAjt + α4Acollatjt + εjt    (3) 
LEVjt = Σ10 α1986-1995 +Σk αk1-kXX + α1PESOjt + α2ROAjt + α3lnTAjt + α4Acollatjt +α5Growjt + εjt   (4) 
LEVjt = Σ10 α1986-1995 +Σk αk1-kXX + α1PESOjt + α2ROAjt + α3lnTAjt + α4Acollatjt +α6AssetUjt + εjt   (5) 
LEVjt = Σ10 α86-95 +Σk αk1-kXX + α1PESOjt + α2ROAjt + α3lnTAjt + α4Acollatjt + α5Growjt +α6AssetUjt + +α7Taxjt + εjt (6) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Intercept 0.43536 
(118.51) 
     
PESO 
(stock options/shs) 
0.0523*** 
 (8.08) 
0.0929*** 
(18.04) 
0.0843*** 
(16.62) 
0.0865*** 
(13.60) 
0.0900*** 
(10.69) 
0.1109*** 
(4.83) 
ROA 
(return on assets) 
-0.0952*** 
(-35.38) 
-0.0832*** 
 (-43.35) 
-0.0764*** 
(-40.32) 
-0.1612*** 
(-42.48) 
-0.2039*** 
(-41.59) 
-0.2568*** 
(-23.39) 
lnTA 
(log total assets) 
0.0224*** 
(42.98) 
-0.0357*** 
(-25.51) 
-0.0375*** 
(-27.06) 
-0.0622*** 
(-32.16) 
-0.0516*** 
(-21.12) 
-0.0749*** 
(-15.82) 
Acollat 
(asset collateral value) 
  0.2962*** 
(43.20) 
0.2727*** 
(27.32) 
0.2293*** 
(19.04) 
0.1308*** 
(5.34) 
Grow 
(growth options) 
   0.0000013 
(0.04) 
 -0.00079 
(-0.26) 
AssetU 
(asset uniqueness) 
    -0.0010*** 
(-4.92) 
-0.0017 
(-0.56) 
Tax 
(tax shield) 
     -0.0017 
(-0.62) 
1995 -0.0227*** 
(-4.30) 
0.0721*** 
(19.75) 
0.0846*** 
(23.38) 
0.1081*** 
(22.83) 
0.1175*** 
(18.89) 
0.1351*** 
(12.27) 
1994 -0.0289*** 
(-5.81) 
0.0578*** 
(16.9) 
0.0698*** 
(20.60) 
0.0987*** 
(22.18) 
0.1011*** 
(16.70) 
0.1277*** 
(12.06) 
1993 -0.0192*** 
(-3.95) 
0.0576*** 
(17.50) 
0.0700*** 
(21.46) 
0.0963*** 
(22.48) 
0.0994*** 
(16.74) 
0.1226*** 
(11.91) 
1992 0.0022 
(0.45) 
0.0681*** 
(21) 
0.0781*** 
(24.32) 
0.0966*** 
(22.86) 
0.1086*** 
(18.34) 
0.1175*** 
(11.53) 
1991 0.0156*** 
(3.14) 
0.0726*** 
(22.49) 
0.0807*** 
(25.26) 
0.1012*** 
(24.17) 
0.1120*** 
(18.86) 
0.1164*** 
(11.52) 
1990 0.0314*** 
(6.25) 
0.0776*** 
(24.09) 
0.0835*** 
(26.22) 
0.1028*** 
(24.54) 
0.1190** 
(18.53) 
0.1157*** 
(10.38) 
1989 0.0303*** 
(6.05) 
0.0676*** 
(21.22) 
0.0738*** 
(23.43) 
0.0922*** 
(22.19) 
0.1047*** 
(16.36) 
0.1170*** 
(10.40) 
1988 0.0262*** 
(5.25) 
0.0532*** 
(17.02) 
0.0587*** 
(19.02) 
0.0714*** 
(17.46) 
0.0843*** 
(13.73) 
0.0898*** 
(8.32) 
1987 0.0183*** 
(3.71) 
0.0332*** 
(10.88) 
0.0401*** 
(13.34) 
0.0516*** 
(12.89) 
0.0576*** 
(9.95) 
0.0628*** 
(6.26) 
1986 0.0182*** 
(3.68) 
0.0235*** 
(7.83) 
0.0287*** 
(9.7) 
0.0303*** 
(7.76) 
0.0339*** 
(6.11) 
0.0213** 
(2.3) 
Fixed Firm Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 
R-squared 
AIC 
58158 
0.045 
-148697 
58158 
 
-208092 
57553 
 
-207916 
30214 
 
-112244 
21245 
 
-78200 
4916 
 
-19619 
  
1Table 5 presents pooled regression results.  LEV is book value of debt-to-total assets, PESO is options granted divided 
by common shares outstanding, ROA is return on assets, lnTA is log of total assets, Acollat is asset collateral value, 
Grow is a measure of growth options calculated as R&D divided by sales, Tax is interest tax credits divided by total 
assets, AssetU is asset uniqueness calculated as selling expense divided by sales.  Year dummies variables are included 
as 1995, 1994, etc.   
2T-statistics appear under coefficient estimates in parentheses.   
3(*) indicates significance at the 10% level, (**) at the 5% level, (***) at the 1% level. 
4Fixed Firm effects are accounted for using Mundlak’s deviations from the mean procedure. 
5AIC is the Akaike’s Information Criterion fit statistic. 
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Table 6 
Causal Relationship 
 
Panel 1:  Granger Causality Tests (Do changes in options Granger cause changes in leverage) 
Models: 
ΔLEVjt = α0 + Σ10 α86-95 +α1ΔPESOjt-1 + α2ΔLEVjt-1 + α3ROAjt-1 + α4lnTAjt-1 + α5Acollatjt-1 +εjt    (1) 
ΔLEVjt = α0 + Σ10 α86-95 +α1ΔPESOjt-1 + α2ΔLEVjt-1 + α3ROAjt-1 + α4lnTAjt-1 + α5Acollatjt-1 + α6Growjt-1 +εjt   (2) 
ΔLEVjt = α0 + Σ10 α86-95 +α1ΔPESOjt-1 + α2ΔLEVjt-1 + α3ROAjt-1 + α4lnTAjt-1 + α5Acollatjt-1 + α7AssetUjt-1 +εjt   (3) 
ΔLEVjt = α0 + Σ10 α86-95 +α1ΔPESOjt-1 + α2ΔLEVjt-1 + α3ROAjt-1 + α4lnTAjt-1 + α5Acollatjt-1 + α6Growjt-1 +α7AssetUjt-1 +εjt  (4) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Intercept 0.0109 
(2.65) 
0.0216 
(3.96) 
0.0015 
(0.18) 
0.0343 
(3.40) 
ΔPESO 0.0122 
(1.24) 
0.0124 
(1.04) 
0.0162 
(1.07) 
0.0215 
(1.25) 
ΔLEV -0.1673 *** 
(-25.93) 
-0.1632*** 
(-18.55) 
-0.1960*** 
(-17.55) 
-0.1456*** 
(-9.40) 
ROA 
(return on assets) 
-0.0131*** 
(-3.33) 
-0.0029 
(-0.56) 
-0.0526*** 
(-6.45) 
-0.0728*** 
(-7.33) 
lnTA 
(log total assets) 
0.0002 
(0.34) 
0.00005 
(0.09) 
0.0010 
(1.01) 
0.0014 
(1.18) 
Acollat 
(asset collateral value) 
-0.0021 
(-0.50) 
-0.0093 
(-1.53) 
0.0207*** 
(2.74) 
0.0069 
(0.68) 
Grow 
(growth options) 
 0.00003 
(0.59) 
 -0.0115 ** 
(-2.06) 
AssetU 
(asset uniqueness) 
  0.0001 
(0.36) 
0.0001 
(0.48) 
N 
R-squared 
23410 
0.033 
13226 
.033 
8834 
.040 
5142 
.031 
  
Panel 2:  Granger Causality Tests (Do changes in leverage Granger cause changes in options) 
Models: 
ΔPESOjt = α0 + Σ10 α86-95 +α1ΔLEVjt-1 + α2ΔPESOjt-1 + α3ROAjt-1 + α4lnTAjt-1 + α5Acollatjt-1 + εjt    (1) 
ΔPESOjt = α0 + Σ10 α86-95 +α1ΔLEVjt-1 + α2ΔPESOjt-1 + α3ROAjt-1 + α4lnTAjt-1 + α5Acollatjt-1 + α6Growjt-1 +εjt   (2) 
ΔPESOjt = α0 + Σ10 α86-95 +α1ΔLEVjt-1 + α2ΔPESOjt-1 + α3ROAjt-1 + α4lnTAjt-1 + α5Acollatjt-1 +α7AssetUjt-1 +εjt   (3) 
ΔPESOjt = α0 + Σ10 α86-95 +α1ΔLEVjt-1 + α2ΔPESOjt-1 + α3ROAjt-1 + α4lnTAjt-1 + α5Acollatjt-1 + α6Growjt-1 +α7AssetUjt-1 +εjt  (4) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Intercept 0.0126*** 
(5.59) 
0.0145** 
(4.91) 
0.0122*** 
(2.67) 
0.0152** 
(2.32) 
ΔLEV  0.0052 
(1.47) 
0.0120** 
(2.52) 
0.0026 
(0.42) 
.0099 
(0.98) 
ΔPESO -0.2982*** 
(-55.06) 
-0.1800*** 
(-27.87) 
-0.3702*** 
(-43.11) 
-0.2697*** 
(-24.11) 
ROA 
(return on assets) 
0.0008 
(0.35) 
0.0063*** 
(2.25) 
0.0049 
(1.06) 
0.0044 
(0.68) 
lnTA 
(log total assets) 
-0.0011*** 
(-4.18) 
-0.0015*** 
(-4.58) 
-0.0012** 
(-2.17) 
-0.0018** 
(-2.35) 
Acollat 
(asset collateral value) 
-0.0047** 
(-2.02) 
-0.0014 
(-0.43) 
-0.0027 
(-0.62) 
-0.0018 
(-0.27) 
Grow 
(growth options) 
 0.000002 
(0.09) 
 -0.0031 
(-0.85) 
AssetU 
(asset uniqueness) 
  -0.00001 
(-0.64) 
-0.00008 
(-0.47) 
N 
R-squared 
23410 
0.116 
13226 
0.058 
8834 
0.176 
5142 
0.105 
  
1Table 6 displays the results of the Granger causality test for the entire sample.   
2Panel 1 presents the results of the test of option changes Granger causing leverage changes. 
3Panel 2 presents the results of the test of leverage changes Granger causing option changes.   
4t-statistics appear under coefficient estimates in parentheses. 
5(*) indicates significance at the 10% level, (**) at the 5% level, (***) at the 1% level. 
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Table 7 
Descriptive Statistics by sample partition  
 
Upper Lower Upper Lower
(MVE >71 mil) (MEV<71 mil) (PCTOWN>.201)  (PCTOWN<.201)
LEV Median 0.51 0.502 0.52 0.495 0.531
Mean 0.513 0.5 0.526 0.492 0.535
(std) (0.25) (0.22) (0.27) (0.22) (0.27)
PESO Median 0.075 0.064 0.091 0.076 0.074
Mean 0.097 0.079 0.114 0.095 0.099
(std) (0.11) (0.08) (0.12) (0.08) (0.13)
TA Median 94.2 383.9 28 222.2 31.9
Mean 1418.6 2779.4 84.5 1687.8 1149.4
(std) (7442) (10388) (533) (8450) (6262)
MVE Median 71.1 357 17.2 201 21
Mean 1092 2160.5 23.1 1440.1 737.5
(std) (4512) (6198) (19.10) (5018) (3898)
ROA Median 0.071 0.098 0.04 0.092 0.047
Mean 0.029 0.089 -0.029 0.082 -0.024
(std) (0.26) (0.15) (-0.323) (0.14) (-0.33)
Acollat Median 0.522 0.518 0.525 0.523 0.518
Mean 0.505 0.508 0.502 0.508 0.502
(std) (0.22) (0.22) (0.23) (0.22) (0.23)
GROW Median 0.028 0.026 0.031 0.025 0.034
Mean 1.05 1.29 0.7977 0.8361 1.27
(std) (25.60) (31.30) (18.20) (24.70) (26.60)
AssetU Median 0.231 0.21 0.254 0.215 0.254
Mean 0.417 0.426 0.41 0.402 0.434
(std) (5.59) (8.08) (2.12) (7.58) (2.25)
Percent Institutional Ownership 
partitioned sampleTotal
MVE 
partitioned sample
 
1Table 7 provides descriptive statistics for the entire sample and for the two sample partitions, first by market value 
of equity, then by institutional ownership.  LEV is book value of debt-to-total assets, PESO is options granted 
divided by common shares outstanding, ROA is return on assets, lnTA is log of total assets, Acollat is asset 
collateral value, Grow is a measure of growth options calculated as R&D expense divided by sales, AssetU is asset 
uniqueness calculated as selling expense divided by sales. 
2Sample standard deviations appear in parentheses.  
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Table 8 
Causal Relationship (Market Value of Equity Partition) 
 
Panel 1:  Granger Causality Tests (do changes in options Granger cause changes in leverage) 
Models: 
ΔLEVjt = α0 + Σ10 α86-95 +α1ΔPESO-Ujt-1 + α2ΔPESO-Ljt-1 + α3ΔLEV-Ujt-1 + α4ΔLEV-Ljt-1  + 
  α5ROA-Ujt-1 + α6ROA-Ljt-1 +α7lnTA-Ujt-1 +α8lnTA-Ljt-1 + α9Acollat-Ujt-1 +α10Acollat-Ljt-1 +εjt    (1) 
 
ΔLEVjt = α0 + Σ10 α86-95 +α1ΔPESO-Ujt-1 + α2ΔPESO-Ljt-1 + α3ΔLEV-Ujt-1 + α4ΔLEV-Ljt-1  + α5ROA-Ujt-1 + 
  α6ROA-Ljt-1 +α7lnTA-Ujt-1 +α8lnTA-Ljt-1 + α9Acollat-Ujt-1 +α10Acollat-Ljt-1 + α11Grow-Ujt-1 +α12Grow-Ljt-1 + εjt   (2) 
 
ΔLEVjt = α0 + Σ10 α86-95 +α1ΔPESO-Ujt-1 + α2ΔPESO-Ljt-1 + α3ΔLEV-Ujt-1 + α4ΔLEV-Ljt-1 + α5ROA-Ujt-1 +  
  α6ROA-Ljt-1 +α7lnTA-Ujt-1 +α8lnTA-Ljt-1 + α9Acollat-Ujt-1 + α10Acollat-Ljt-1 + α11AssetU-Ujt-1 + α12AssetU-Ljt-1 +εjt  (3) 
 
ΔLEVjt = α0 + Σ10 α86-95 +α1ΔPESO-Ujt-1 + α2ΔPESO-Ljt-1 + α3ΔLEV-Ujt-1 + α4ΔLEV-Ljt-1  +  α5ROA-Ujt-1 +  
  α6ROA-Ljt-1 +α7lnTA-Ujt-1 +α8lnTA-Ljt-1 + α9Acollat-Ujt-1 +α10Acollat-Ljt-1 + α11Grow-Ujt-1 +α12Grow-Ljt-1 +  
  α13AssetU-Ujt-1 + α14AssetU-Ljt-1 +εjt                    (4)           
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
ΔPESO-U 
 
-0.0044 
(-0.31) 
0.0007 
(0.05) 
-0.0072 
(-0.37) 
0.0020 
(0.11) 
ΔPESO-L 
 
0.0206 
(1.50) 
0.0226 
(1.07) 
0.0289 
(1.24) 
0.0729* 
(1.78) 
Pr>F 
R-squared 
N 
0.2033 
0.0416 
23410 
0.3909 
0.0429 
13226 
0.2362 
0.0539 
8835 
0.1164 
0.0446 
5142 
  
 
Panel 2:  Granger Causality Tests (do changes in leverage Granger cause changes in options) 
ΔPESOjt = α0 + Σ10 α86-95 +α1ΔLEV-Ujt-1 + α2ΔLEV-Ljt-1 + α3ΔPESO-Ujt-1 + α4ΔPESO-Ljt-1  + α5ROA-Ujt-1 +  
  α6ROA-Ljt-1 +α7lnTA-Ujt-1 +α8lnTA-Ljt-1 + α9Acollat-Ujt-1 +α10Acollat-Ljt-1 +εjt     (1) 
 
ΔPESOjt = α0 + Σ10 α86-95 +α1ΔLEV-Ujt-1 + α2ΔLEV-Ljt-1 + α3ΔPESO-Ujt-1 + α4ΔPESO-Ljt-1  + α5ROA-Ujt-1 +  
  α6ROA-Ljt-1 +α7lnTA-Ujt-1 +α8lnTA-Ljt-1 + α9Acollat-Ujt-1 +α10Acollat-Ljt-1 + α11Grow-Ujt-1 +α12Grow-Ljt-1 + εjt   (2) 
 
ΔPESOjt = α0 + Σ10 α86-95 +α1ΔLEV-Ujt-1 + α2ΔLEV-Ljt-1 + α3ΔPESO-Ujt-1 + α4ΔPESO-Ljt-1  +   α5ROA-Ujt-1 +  
  α6ROA-Ljt-1 +α7lnTA-Ujt-1 +α8lnTA-Ljt-1 + α9Acollat-Ujt-1 +α10Acollat-Ljt-1 + α11AssetU-Ujt-1 + α12AssetU-Ljt-1 +εjt  (3) 
 
ΔPESOjt = α0 + Σ10 α86-95 +α1ΔLEV-Ujt-1 + α2ΔLEV-Ljt-1 + α3ΔPESO-Ujt-1 + α4ΔPESO-Ljt-1  + α5ROA-Ujt-1 +  
  α6ROA-Ljt-1 +α7lnTA-Ujt-1 +α8lnTA-Ljt-1 + α9Acollat-Ujt-1 +α10Acollat-Ljt-1 + α11Grow-Ujt-1 +α12Grow-Ljt-1 +  
  α13AssetU-Ujt-1 + α14AssetU-Ljt-1 +εjt         (4) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
ΔLEV-U 
 
0.0185*** 
(2.91) 
0.0348*** 
(4.06) 
0.0332*** 
(2.60) 
0.0569*** 
(3.08) 
ΔLEV-L 
 
-0.0001 
(-0.03) 
-0.00002 
(-0.00) 
-0.0049 
(-0.68) 
-0.0155 
(-1.29) 
Pr>F 
R-squared 
N 
0.0159** 
0.133 
23410 
0.0007*** 
0.060 
13226 
0.0092*** 
0.191 
8835 
0.001*** 
0.110 
5142 
  
1Table 8 presents the Granger Causality Results of two sub-samples formed on the basis of market value of equity.   
2Firms above the median MVE of $71 million are classified as Upper while those below the median are 
classified as Lower.  Coefficients corresponding to the sub-samples are denoted U or L, respectively. 
3Panel 1 presents the results of the test of option changes Granger causing leverage changes.  
4Panel 2 presents the results of the test of leverage changes Granger causing option changes. 
5Pr>F is an F-test of the difference between the upper (*-U) and lower (*-L) coefficients. 
6t-statistics appear under coefficient estimates in parentheses. 
7(*) indicates significance at the 10% level, (**) at the 5% level, (***) at the 1% level. 
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Table 9 
Causal Relationship (Institutional Ownership Partition) 
 
Panel 1:  Granger Causality Tests (do changes in options Granger cause changes in leverage) 
Models: 
ΔLEVjt = α0 + Σ10 α86-95 +α1ΔPESO-Ujt-1 + α2ΔPESO-Ljt-1 + α3ΔLEV-Ujt-1 + α4ΔLEV-Ljt-1  + α5ROA-Ujt-1 +  
  α6ROA-Ljt-1 +α7lnTA-Ujt-1 +α8lnTA-Ljt-1 + α9Acollat-Ujt-1 +α10Acollat-Ljt-1 +εjt                (1) 
 
ΔLEVjt = α0 + Σ10 α86-95 +α1ΔPESO-Ujt-1 + α2ΔPESO-Ljt-1 + α3ΔLEV-Ujt-1 + α4ΔLEV-Ljt-1  + α5ROA-Ujt-1 +  
  α6ROA-Ljt-1 +α7lnTA-Ujt-1 +α8lnTA-Ljt-1 + α9Acollat-Ujt-1 +α10Acollat-Ljt-1 + α11Grow-Ujt-1 +α12Grow-Ljt-1 + εjt   (2) 
 
ΔLEVjt = α0 + Σ10 α86-95 +α1ΔPESO-Ujt-1 + α2ΔPESO-Ljt-1 + α3ΔLEV-Ujt-1 + α4ΔLEV-Ljt-1  + α5ROA-Ujt-1 +  
  α6ROA-Ljt-1 +α7lnTA-Ujt-1 +α8lnTA-Ljt-1 + α9Acollat-Ujt-1 +α10Acollat-Ljt-1 + α11AssetU-Ujt-1 + α12AssetU-Ljt-1 +εjt   (3) 
 
ΔLEVjt = α0 + Σ10 α86-95 +α1ΔPESO-Ujt-1 + α2ΔPESO-Ljt-1 + α3ΔLEV-Ujt-1 + α4ΔLEV-Ljt-1  +   α5ROA-Ujt-1 +  
  α6ROA-Ljt-1 +α7lnTA-Ujt-1 +α8lnTA-Ljt-1 + α9Acollat-Ujt-1 +α10Acollat-Ljt-1 + α11Grow-Ujt-1 +α12Grow-Ljt-1 +  
  α13AssetU-Ujt-1 + α14AssetU-Ljt-1 +εjt                    (4)           
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
ΔPESO-U 
 
-0.0068 
(-0.51) 
0.0047 
(0.34) 
-0.0094 
(-0.48) 
0.0040 
(0.21) 
ΔPESO-L 
 
0.0284* 
(1.92) 
0.0251 
(1.04) 
0.0460* 
(1.95) 
.0948** 
(2.38) 
Pr>F 
R-squared 
N 
0.0760* 
0.036 
23410 
0.4606 
0.035 
13226 
0.0722* 
0.045 
8835 
0.0396** 
0.036 
5142 
  
 
Panel 2:  Granger Causality Tests (do changes in leverage Granger cause changes in options) 
 
ΔPESOjt = α0 + Σ10 α86-95 +α1ΔLEV-Ujt-1 + α2ΔLEV-Ljt-1 + α3ΔPESO-Ujt-1 + α4ΔPESO-Ljt-1  + α5ROA-Ujt-1 +  
  α6ROA-Ljt-1 +α7lnTA-Ujt-1 +α8lnTA-Ljt-1 + α9Acollat-Ujt-1 +α10Acollat-Ljt-1 +εjt              (1) 
 
ΔPESOjt = α0 + Σ10 α86-95 +α1ΔLEV-Ujt-1 + α2ΔLEV-Ljt-1 + α3ΔPESO-Ujt-1 + α4ΔPESO-Ljt-1  + α5ROA-Ujt-1 +  
  α6ROA-Ljt-1 +α7lnTA-Ujt-1 +α8lnTA-Ljt-1 + α9Acollat-Ujt-1 +α10Acollat-Ljt-1 + α11Grow-Ujt-1 +α12Grow-Ljt-1 + εjt   (2) 
 
ΔPESOjt = α0 + Σ10 α86-95 +α1ΔLEV-Ujt-1 + α2ΔLEV-Ljt-1 + α3ΔPESO-Ujt-1 + α4ΔPESO-Ljt-1  + α5ROA-Ujt-1 +  
  α6ROA-Ljt-1 +α7lnTA-Ujt-1 +α8lnTA-Ljt-1 + α9Acollat-Ujt-1 +α10Acollat-Ljt-1 + α11AssetU-Ujt-1 + α12AssetU-Ljt-1 +εjt   (3) 
 
ΔPESOjt = α0 + Σ10 α86-95 +α1ΔLEV-Ujt-1 + α2ΔLEV-Ljt-1 + α3ΔPESO-Ujt-1 + α4ΔPESO-Ljt-1  + α5ROA-Ujt-1 +  
  α6ROA-Ljt-1 +α7lnTA-Ujt-1 +α8lnTA-Ljt-1 + α9Acollat-Ujt-1 +α10Acollat-Ljt-1 + α11Grow-Ujt-1 +α12Grow-Ljt-1 +  
  α13AssetU-Ujt-1 + α14AssetU-Ljt-1 +εjt                    (4) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
ΔLEV-U 
 
0.0199*** 
(2.98) 
0.0381*** 
(4.08) 
0.0279** 
(2.26) 
0.0470** 
(2.52) 
ΔLEV-L 
 
0.0006 
(0.14) 
0.0031 
(0.56) 
-0.0021 
(-0.28) 
-0.0087 
(-0.72) 
Pr>F 
R-squared 
N 
0.0136** 
0.140 
23410 
0.0012*** 
0.059 
13226 
0.0368** 
0.190 
8835 
0.0120** 
0.110 
5142 
  
1Table 9 presents the Granger Causality Results of two sub-samples formed on the basis of institutional ownership (on a 
percentage basis).  Firms above the median institutional ownership of 20.1% are classified as Upper while those below the 
median are classified as Lower.  Coefficients corresponding to the sub-samples are denoted U or L. 
2Panel 1 presents the results of the test of option changes Granger causing leverage changes.  
3Panel 2 presents the results of the test of leverage changes Granger causing option changes. 
4Pr>F is an F-test of the difference between the upper (*-U) and lower (*-L) coefficients.  
5t-statistics appear under coefficient estimates in parentheses. 
6(*) indicates significance at the 10% level, (**) at the 5% level, (***) at the 1% level. 
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Executive Stock Options and Bank Risk 
Essay Two 
 
Introduction:  
In Essay One, I documented a positive contemporaneous relationship between executive 
stock option compensation and changes in leverage.  I further showed that this relationship arises 
in part because managers of firms with low institutional ownership (i.e., low monitoring) are able 
to act on their incentives to increase firm risk.1  In this essay, I investigate the relationship 
between executive stock option compensation and risk-taking behavior in the banking industry 
(an industry that was excluded from the sample in Essay One).  This industry is of interest 
because of its high level of regulatory oversight, aimed at reducing the probability of bank 
failures.  From the regulators' standpoint – and, arguably, from a macro-economic standpoint as 
well – it is thus undesirable when bank managers respond to the incentives provided by 
executive compensation to increase bank risk.  Consequently, it is important to document if this 
occurs.  
The banking industry is also an interesting setting to study the relationship between 
executive stock option compensation and risk-taking behavior because bank managers face 
conflicting pressures/incentives concerning risk.  On the one hand, the regulatory oversight acts 
as a form of monitoring that limits bank managers’ ability to increase bank risk, and thus also 
limits their ability to increase the value of their executive stock options by increasing bank risk.  
                                                          
1 This incentive exists because the value of the manager’s option compensation is increasing in firm risk.  In the 
Black Scholes framework, this is reflected in the positive value for Vega, (the partial derivative of the call option 
value with respect to stock volatility).   
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On the other hand, the principal source of funds for most banks is deposit accounts, which are 
insured by the FDIC against losses up to $100,000.  This insurance creates general indifference 
on the part of the depositor to the riskiness of the bank (Houston and James, 1995), and thus 
banks are less likely than non-banks to bear increased costs of future debt when they increase 
their risk.  This, in direct conflict with the objective of the regulatory oversight, creates the 
incentive for bank managers to increase risk.  It is not clear, therefore, which effect dominates: 
the regulatory oversight that limits banks' ability to increase risk, or the incentive to take on more 
risk because the market does not penalize banks as much as non-banks for doing so.  This study 
investigates that empirical question.  
An additional benefit of focusing solely on banks is the availability of a wide range of 
risk measures beyond that of firm leverage.  One aspect of bank regulation is that banks that are 
regulated by the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, or the 
Comptroller of the Currency, must report detailed information on their condition and income.  
Measures of the riskiness of a bank’s liabilities and assets available in these reports include: 
relative levels of managed liabilities or brokered deposits, insured deposits, cash and treasury 
securities, foreign deposits, consumer loans, and commercial loans, among others.  I use the FR-
Y9 for bank holding companies to calculate precise measurements of managerial risk-taking 
behavior in response to risk incentives created from stock options granted to bank CEOs.  In 
addition to the benefit, from an empirical standpoint, of having additional risk measures, it is also 
important from a regulatory standpoint to understand which, if any, of these risk components 
bank managers manipulate in response to their compensation incentives.  With that information, 
regulators will be able to take more efficient counteracting measures, if they decide this is 
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desirable.  This study investigates the relation between executive stock option compensation and 
17 different risk components. 
I investigate the relationship between executive stock option compensation and risk 
taking behavior in the banking industry using a combination of OLS and simultaneous equation 
estimation methodologies.  The simultaneous methodology attempts to control for the opposite 
effects of stock and stock options on bank risk, while also trying to disentangle the causal 
relationship between risk and risk incentives.  I calculate the sensitivity of the manager’s wealth 
portfolio to risk (Vega) and to performance (Delta).  For a sample of 100 bank holding 
companies from the S&P 1500, over the sample period 1992-2003, I first document a consistent 
upward trend in Vega, and a consistent downward trend in Delta over time.  This suggests that 
bank managers may indeed be increasing bank risk in response to the incentives from their 
option compensation.  I further document that Delta is related to bank capital-asset ratios, while 
Vega is not.  I also find that Vega is positively associated with measures of credit risk, including 
net charge offs, allowances for loan losses, and foreign commercial loans.  Vega is negatively 
associated with measure of bank liquidity, such as core deposit ratio and securities to loans.  
These results suggest bank managers do respond to the risk incentives created by option grants.  
Collectively, the findings of this research can assist regulators in identifying areas of bank risk 
associated with certain types of managerial compensation contracts, and help the regulators 
improve their oversight of the banking industry. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section I provides background and a brief literature 
review, Section II provides discussion of managerial incentives, bank risk measures, and data 
selection, Section III discusses the OLS and simultaneous estimation methodologies, Section IV 
presents results, and Section V concludes.   
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Section I:  Background and Related Literature 
 There is an extensive literature that documents the effects that managerial compensation 
structure has on the levels of asset and financing risk that managers choose.  For example, 
Anderson et al. (2000) find that less diversified firms have higher equity ownership and higher 
pay-for-performance sensitivity.  Coles, et al. (2004) find similar results and add that firms with 
higher managerial risk incentives have relatively higher leverage.  Rogers (2002) finds a negative 
relationship between CEO risk incentives and the amount of derivatives used to hedge interest 
rate and exchange risk. 
Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) find that, in a sample of oil and gas companies, risk 
incentives from options motivate managers to take on additional exploration risk, and that 
managers with higher risk incentives from stock options reduce reserve hedging activities.2  My 
research is related to their in that I also analyze one specific industry, banking.  Furthermore, 
Rajgopal and Shevlin take advantage of risk measures particular to the oil and gas industry, 
while I take advantage of risk measures specific to the banking industry. 
 Houston and James (1995) analyze the relationship between managerial compensation 
and risk taking in banks.  Although their research is seemingly close to my proposed research, 
they actually test the determinants of CEO compensation (salary and options), and not whether 
compensation affects bank risk.  My research differs from theirs in a number of important ways.  
First, I measure the incentive to increase risk by calculating the sensitivity of executive wealth to 
risk (Vega).  Their measures of compensation capture overall value, but do not measure a 
manager’s financial incentives to increase risk.  Second, the measures of risk differ between the 
two studies.  Houston and James measure risk as stock return volatility.  While this would 
                                                          
2 My research is related to their in that I also analyze one specific industry, banking.  Furthermore, where Rajgopal 
and Shevlin take advantage of risk measures particular to the oil and gas industry, I take advantage of risk measures 
specific to banking.   
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capture the effect of increasing risk, many things unassociated with managerial decisions affect 
volatility.  I improve on this by looking at specific assets and liabilities under the direct control 
of the manager.  Furthermore, identifying specific assets and liabilities manipulated by the bank 
manager will allow regulators to refine their oversight.   
 Bryan et al. (2005) analyze the effect of deregulation on CEO compensation in the 
electric utility industry.  The electric utility industry, like banking, has a high level of regulatory 
oversight.  Their results indicate that pay-for-performance sensitivity increases after 
deregulation.  Brewer et al. (2004) analyze the relationship of executive compensation, 
regulatory change, and risk taking for a sample of 100 bank holding companies.  They find that 
equity based compensation (EBC) increases after the deregulatory Reigle-Neal Act, and that 
bank leverage is not a determinant of EBC.  They also find that risk, as measured by daily stock 
volatility, is a (positive) determinant of EBC.  My paper differs from theirs in a number of ways.  
First, I allow compensation to affect bank risk, including leverage.  Second, I measure option 
compensation through the sensitivity to risk and performance, as opposed to Brewer et al., who 
measure the ratio of equity based compensation to total compensation.  Kwan and Eisenbeis 
(1997) analyze bank risk, capitalization and inefficiencies in banks using a three equation 
system.  They find that these three measures are simultaneously determined and provide support 
that for the hypothesis that risk averse managers expend resources to reduce bank risk, thus 
leading to the appearance of bank inefficiencies.  Bliss and Rosen (2001) analyze the interaction 
between bank mergers and compensation.  They find that CEO compensation increases after 
bank mergers, even if the merger leads to a stock price decrease, consistent with empire building. 
They also find that increasing stock-based compensation reduces the likelihood of bank mergers.  
Mishra and Nielsen (2000) analyze board independence, bank performance and pay-for-
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performance in bank holding companies.  They document a substitution effect between board 
independence and pay-for-performance sensitivity.     
  
Section II:  Variable Construction and Sample Selection 
A: Managerial Incentives 
I measure managerial risk incentives by calculating the pay-for-risk sensitivity, Vega, of 
managerial stock options portfolios.  In Essay One I use a measure of stock option compensation 
derived from a balance sheet account which is a stock account reserved for stock option exercise, 
Compustat data item 215.  However, this variable is not available for bank holding companies.3 
To calculate the pay-for-risk sensitivity, I use the “one-year approximation” methodology 
of Core and Guay (2002), which is an application of the well-known Black Scholes option 
pricing equation.  This measures the change in option portfolio value, given a 1% change in the 
stock return volatility.  This methodology uses characteristics of newly granted options, 
previously granted-exercisable options, and previously granted-unexercisable options.  The 
specific characteristics used in this method are time to maturity, dividend yield, volatility, risk-
free rate, strike price, and current stock price.  With the exception of the risk-free rate of interest, 
this information is reported in the Compustat ExecuComp database for all new option grants.  
Simplifying assumptions are made about the exercise price and maturity of all previously granted 
options.4  Individual Vegas are calculated for each of the three types of options and these are 
subsequently compiled for each executive and within each firm-year.    
                                                          
3 Compustat does not report data item 215 for any firms in SIC6020 (Commercial Banks), SIC6021 (National 
Commercial Banks), SIC6022 (State Commercial Banks), SIC6035 (Federally Chartered Savings Institutions), or 
SIC6036 (Savings Institutions, not Federally Chartered).   
4 The assumption about the maturity allows an appropriate risk-free rate of interest to be selected.   
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B: Data and Sample Selection 
I use the intersection of bank data and executive compensation data yielding a sample of 
100 bank holding companies.  The bank data for the holding companies come from the FR-Y9 
consolidated financial statements.  These are quarterly filings and are obtained from the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago.5 
Compensation data are from Compustat Execucomp.  These data are compiled from 
proxy statements and contain compensation information for the top five firm executives.  The 
detailed data provide information about salary, stock compensation, other long term incentive 
compensation, and option compensation.  Of particular use for this study is the information about 
the option compensation: stock options granted, options held, and options exercised, as well as 
necessary inputs for the Black Scholes option pricing model.  The data are obtained for the 
banking firms included in the S&P 1500.6  This data covers the years 1992 through 2003, and 
thus is entirely post the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991.7   
Risk free interest rates are also required as inputs for the Black Scholes model to 
calculate the option sensitivities.  Risk-Free interest rates are measured using treasury yields on 
the CRSP tapes.   
The bank risk measures used in this study can be placed into one of five categories:  
credit risk, liquidity risk, interest rate risk, operational risk, and capital or solvency risk.   
C: Credit Risk 
 Credit risk refers to the risk associated with the asset quality of banks and the probability 
of default on those assets.  Banks face the risk that borrows will default on loans, that securities 
                                                          
5 Bank Holding Company data is available at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s website: 
http://www.chicagofed.org/economic_research_and_data/bhc_data.cfm. 
6 Data are collected for firms with SIC codes of 6020. 
7 This sample is entirely post-Prompt Corrective Action, which was part of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) in December 1991. 
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owned will fail, and that these will affect bank profitability, market value equity levels, and/or 
bank stability (Koch and McDonald, 2000).   I use 7 measures of credit risk:  NETCHGOFF, 
which is net charge offs to total loans, NONPERFLOANTL, which is non-performing loans to 
total loans, ALLOWLNLOSSTL, which is the ratio of allowances for loan losses to total loans, 
COMMREALESTATELOANS, which is the sum of commercial loans (foreign and domestic) 
and real estate loans divided by total loans, REALESTATELOANSTL, which is the ratio of real 
estate loans to total loans, DCOMMLOANTL, which is the ratio of domestic commercial loans 
to total loans, and lastly, FCOMMLOANTL, which is the ratio of foreign commercial loans to 
total loans.   
D: Liquidity Risk 
 Liquidity risk captures the likelihood a bank will not be able to fund its payment 
obligations as they come due. I use six measures of liquidity risk:  COREDEPRATIO, which is 
the ratio of core deposits to total deposits, SECLOANS, the ratio of securities (held to maturity 
and available for sale) to total loans, BROKEREDDEP, the ratio of total brokered deposits less 
that $100,000 (less then one year and more than one year) to total deposits, FFPURCHRATIO, 
the ratio of purchased federal funds to total deposits, and lastly, JCDRATIO the ratio of Jumbo 
CDs (time deposits of $100,000 or more), to total deposits.   
E: Operational Risk 
 Operational risk is the risk to net income or market value equity from the possibility that 
bank operating expenses may vary significantly.  Some of this risk is generated by inefficiencies 
in controlling costs or discovering employee errors (Koch and McDonald, 2000).  Other aspects 
of this risk stem from employee or customer theft.  I use two measures to capture operational 
risk:  ASSETSPEREMP, calculated as the ratio of total bank assets to the number of full-time 
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equivalent employees, and EXPENSEPEREMP, which is the ratio of employee expense (salaries 
and employee benefits) to the number of full-time equivalent employees.   
F: Interest Rate Risk 
 Interest rate risk captures the likelihood that changes in market interest will negatively 
affect the net income or market value of equity.  I use two measures to capture interest rate risk: 
the one year gap (ONEYRGAP) which is calculated as the absolute value of the difference 
between assets and liabilities which mature or reprice within one year,8 and the gap ratio 
(GAPRATIO) which is the ratio of assets to liabilities which mature or reprice within one year.    
G: Solvency Risk 
 Solvency risk captures the likelihood that a bank will become insolvent or fail.  Any of 
the previous four categories of risk can impact net income or market equity values.  However, 
the current capitalization of the bank can provide a cushion against failure.  I measure solvency 
risk with the capital-asset ratio (CAPASSETRATIO) calculated as the ratio of the total equity 
capital to total assets.   
 The total sample size is 588 firm-year observations.  This is, on average, 49 bank-
observations per year and is on the level of other bank compensation research (e.g. Harjoto and 
Mullineaux, 2003).9 
 
Section III: Methodology 
 To analyze the relationship between bank risk and risk incentives, I use both ordinary 
least squares and simultaneous estimation methodology.  Using ordinary least squares maintains 
                                                          
8 The liabilities are the sum of interest-bearing deposit liabilities, long-term debt, and variable rate preferred stock.   
9 Harjoto and Mullineaux report 438 observations over their 9 year sample for an average of 48.6 observations per 
year. 
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comparability to the results for non-bank firms documented in Essay One.  The first equation 
estimated is as follows: 
 
CAPASSETRATIOj,t = α1 + β2VEGAj,t + β3DELTAj,t +  Zj,t + εj,t      (1) 
 
where CAPASSETRATIO is the capital-asset ratio, VEGA is the pay-for-risk sensitivity, and 
DELTA is the pay-for-performance sensitivity.  Both VEGA and DELTA are calculated using 
the Core and Guay (2002) one year approximation methodology.  The Z-vector is a vector of 
control variables, and can include SIZE, the total assets of the bank, ROA, return on assets, to 
control for bank performance; M2B, the market value of assets to the book value of assets, to 
control for bank growth options and charter value; LOANASSETS, the ratio of total loans to 
total assets, REALESTLOANTL, the ratio of real estate loans to total loans, and SECLOANS, 
the ratio of securities10 to total loans, to control for ….  Year indicator variables are also included 
as elements of the Z-vector.  Year indicator variables proxy for differences across time, including 
regulatory changes such as the Riegle-Neal Act.   
 Equation (1) allows for compensation (VEGA and DELTA) to affect risk taking as 
measured by leverage (CAPASSETRATIO).  To also allow for firm risk taking to affect the 
compensation policy of the firm, VEGA is the dependent variable in equation (2).  This equation 
is estimated as follows:   
 
VEGAj,t = α1 + β2CAPASSETRATIOj,t + β3DELTAj,t +  Zj,t + εj,t      (2) 
where variables are as described above.   
                                                          
10 Securities are the combination of securities held to maturity (BHCK1754) and securities available for sale 
(BHCK1773).   
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 In addition to specifications of Equations (1) and (2), where all variables are specified in 
time t, I use alternative specifications which include changes from time t-1 to time t and also 
lagged independent variables.         
A: Simultaneous Estimation Methodology  
 It is conceivable that there is a simultaneous relationship between risk and risk incentives.  
If so, OLS estimates are biased.  I therefore test for a simultaneous relationship using the 
Hausman test of Endogeniety (Hausman, 1978).  The null hypothesis is that the compensation 
regressors (VEGA and DELTA) are exogenous.  The Hausman test on equation (1) rejects the 
null hypothesis.  I therefore include simultaneous estimation in my analyses.   
Consistent with Coles et al, (2004) and Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) I estimate a three 
equation system.  I use the Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) methodology.  The first equation 
estimates the risk of the firm (leverage, credit risk, etc); the second equation estimates the pay-
for-risk sensitivity of the managers option portfolio (VEGA); and the third equation estimates 
and controls for the pay-for-performance sensitivity of the managers stock and option portfolio.  
The system is as follows:   
 
RISK = VEGA + DELTA + ROA + TOTASSETS + CAPASSETRATIO +DEREG + CEOTENURE (3) 
DELTA = VEGA + RISK + CAPASSETRATIO + ROA + TOTASSETS + SALARY + CEOTENURE (4) 
VEGA = DELTA + RISK + CAPASSETRATIO + M2B + TOTASSETS + SALARY + CEOTENURE (5) 
 
where the variable RISK can be any variable of the five identified bank risk categories.  
SALARY is the total cash salary reported for the manager in year t.  CEOTENURE is the 
reported length of time the manager has occupied the CEO position, measured in days.  This 
variable proxies for CEO experience and CEO entrenchment.  All system equations are exactly 
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identified and are estimated with time t variables.  DEREG is a binary variable based upon the 
adoption of the Riegle-Neal act.  Consistent with Brewer et al. (2004) this variable is equal to 
one after 1996, zero otherwise.  As indicated by Stiroh and Strahan (2003), this change in 
regulation will shift assets to better performing banks.  To control for the possible change in 
assets, I include the DEREG control variable in the estimation of equation (3).  Brewer et al. 
(2004) include deregulation as a control variable in an equation where (equity based) 
compensation is the dependent variable.  Given the restriction requirements on the 
simultaneously estimated system of equations (3), (4), and (5), this is not possible.  The other 
restrictions placed upon the system should be obvious from the omitted variables in each of the 
three equations.     
 
Section IV:  Results 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on managerial risk incentives within the banking 
industry.  The median risk incentive (Vega) across the sample period (1992-2003) is $85,413.11,12  
Consistent with Bliss and Rosen (2001), who document a substantial variance in pay-for-
performance sensitivity (Delta) across banks, I find that pay-for-risk sensitivity varies greatly 
across banks as well.   
Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) document a median Vega of $34,260 for the oil and gas 
industry over the years 1991 through 1997, while Coles et al. (2004) report a median Vega of 
$63,000 for non-bank firms.13   The comparison of Vega’s for banks and non-banks is 
inconsistent with the notion that banks use less stock and option compensation than non-bank 
                                                          
11 The median is cited here because of the highly skewed distribution of Vega for the banking industry.  The mean 
vega is $231,855. 
12 In constant March 2005 dollars.  Adjusting to 1997 dollars, the median is $70,847. 
13 Coles, Daniel, and Naveen’s number is in 2000 dollars.  Adjusting $85,413 to 2000 dollars yields $77,411. 
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firms.  There are several possible reasons for why median Vega in this study is greater than in 
the above cited research.  First, the average size of banks in my sample, as measured by total 
assets, is considerably larger than the reported mean total assets of oil and gas firms: 52.36 
billion and 1.21 billion respectively.  Second, as Figure 1 indicates, there is a substantial increase 
in the level of Vega over the last 3 years of my sample period.  These years are not included in 
the samples of the above two studies.   
Mean annual Delta reaches its maximum ($150,361) in year 1996 and its lowest level 
($37,174) in year 2002.  Bliss and Rosen (2001) document a mean Delta for their banking 
sample (1986-1995) of $104,608, while my sample average delta is $66,253.  Their sample ends 
prior to the large decrease in Delta starting with year 1997 as indicated in Figure 1.  Over my 
sample period (1992-2003), while executive compensation has become less sensitive to 
performance, it has become more sensitive to risk.   The mean risk incentive has increased nearly 
five-fold: from $87,181 in 1992 to $390,245 in 2003.  
A: Ordinary Least Squares Results:   
 Table 2 presents results from estimating equation (1) using OLS.  This equation 
investigates the contemporaneous relationship between CAPASSETRATIO and VEGA.  There 
are eight model specifications, where each subsequent model includes a greater set of control 
variables.   
The coefficients on TOTASSETS are negative and significant, indicating that larger 
banks have lower capital-asset ratios (higher leverage).  Consistent with Kwan and Eisenbeis 
(1997) and Coles et al. (2004) the coefficients on ROA are positive and significant, indicating 
that more profitable banks have higher capital-asset ratios.  The coefficients on LOANASSETS 
are positive and significant, indicating that banks which have more loans have lower leverage.  
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The coefficients on DELTA are negative and significant indicating that firms with higher Deltas 
have higher leverage.  This is consistent with incentive compensation since DELTA is a 
measurement of the performance incentives to the manager, and one way a manager can increase 
performance is to increase leverage.  All VEGA coefficients are positive.  The majority of these 
are insignificant with the exception of Models 2 and 8.  These results indicate that while there is 
a significant contemporaneous relationship between the capital-asset ratio and performance 
incentives, there is no significant relationship between the capital-asset ratio and risk incentives.   
 This is in contrast with the results of Essay One and Coles et al. (2004) for non-bank 
firms.  Given an increase in pay-for-risk sensitivity, manages do not responded by increasing the 
leverage of the banks.   This difference between bank and non-banks may in part be attributed to 
the regulatory nature of the banking industry.  Since banks are highly regulated, and solvency 
risk is of primary concern to regulators, the capital-asset ratio may not be a risk dimension which 
managers want or are able to manipulate.14   
 Table 4 presents the results from estimating equation (2), where the dependent variable is 
VEGA.  There are eight model specifications, each with a different set of control variable.  A 
number of variables are significant in determining pay-for-risk sensitivity.  The upward trend in 
the year dummy variables follows the same upward pattern in Vega as indicated in Figure 1.  
Larger banks have higher sensitivities, as evidenced by the positive and significant coefficients 
on TOTASSETS.  This is not surprising since compensation and size typically have positive 
correlations.  ROA is not significantly related to Vega.  There is a negative relationship between 
pay-for-performance sensitivity and pay-for-risk sensitivity.  The coefficients on DELTA are 
negative and significant.  All CAPASSETRATIO coefficients are positive but the majority of 
                                                          
14 Some casual evidence of this is that the variability of the capital asset ratio is minimal.  Average capital-asset ratio 
for the sample is .082 with a 95% quantile of .107 and a 5% quantile of .061.  Thus there appears to be relatively 
little room for the manager to manipulate solvency risk so as to maximize the value of his stock options.   
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these are insignificant with the exception of Model 2.  These results suggest that there is no 
significant contemporaneous relationship between the risk incentives and solvency risk.   
 Table 5 presents the results of equation (2) estimated where VEGA and 
CAPASSETRATIO are specified as changes, from time t-1 to time t.   The positive and 
significant sign on TOTASSETS suggests that bigger banks are increasing Vega more than 
smaller banks.  The coefficients on ΔCAPASSETRATIO are insignificant, indicating that 
changes in leverage are not related to changes in Vega.  Again, this result for banks is in contrast 
to the non-bank results presented in Essay One, which suggest that, in the presence of low 
monitoring, increases in leverage were followed by increases in option grants.   
B: Simultaneous Estimation Results: 
 The results of the three equation system represented by Equations (3), (4), and (5) are 
presented in Tables 6 through 10.  The three variables jointly determined in this system are Vega, 
Delta, and Risk, where RISK can be a measure of credit risk, liquidity risk, operational risk, 
interest rate risk, or solvency risk. 
   Table 6 presents the results for results for the seven credit risk measures, Table 7 for the 
five liquidity measures, Table 8 for the two operational risk measures, Table 9 for the two 
interest rate risk measures, and Table 10 for the solvency risk measure.  The primary coefficients 
of interest in these 17 regression systems are those on VEGA and DELTA in the estimation of 
RISK, and the coefficients on RISK in the estimation of VEGA and the estimation of DELTA.  
In this sense, these results attempt to disentangle the causal relationship between risk and risk 
incentives. 
 Table 6 displays the results for the seven credit risk variables.  The first panel presents 
results for the system where net charge offs (NETCHGOFF) is the risk measure.  The coefficient 
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on VEGA (2.35 E-8) in the estimation of first system equation is positive and significant, while 
the coefficient on DELTA in the same equation (1.47E-07) is insignificant.  Thus Vega is a 
determinant of Net Charge offs while Delta is not.  The coefficient on NETCHGOFF (-1.02E07) 
in the estimation of the third equation is insignificant.  In fact, for all seven credit risk systems, 
the RISK variables are insignificant in the estimation of both VEGA and DELTA.  VEGA is 
positive and significant for net charge offs (NETCHGOFF), allowances for loan losses 
(ALLOWLNLOSSTL),15 and foreign commercial loans (FCOMMLOANTL).  Thus, higher 
managerial risk incentives are positively associated measures of credit risk.  This is consistent 
with managers acting on the incentives created from option compensation by increasing the 
riskiness of bank assets, thereby increasing the value of their personal wealth portfolios.    
 Table 7 displays the results for the five liquidity ratios.  The first panel displays the 
results for the equation where the core deposit ratio (COREDEPRATIO) is the dependent 
variable.  The VEGA coefficient in this equation (-6.50E-07) is negative and significant (p-value 
0.037).  The coefficient on COREDEPRATIO in the third equation where VEGA is the 
dependent variable is positive (2152247) and insignificant (p-value .968).  VEGA is negative (-
4.44E-07) and significant at the 10% level (p-value .083) in the estimation of securities to loans 
ratio (SECLOANS), and insignificant in the estimation of the three other risk measures.  
Additionally, all liquidity risk measures are insignificant in the estimation of VEGA and 
DELTA.  These results suggest that managers respond to the risk incentives created by stock 
options by decreasing the liquidity of the bank, increasing overall bank risk, thereby increasing 
the value of their stock options.   
 Table 8 presents the results of the system estimation for the two operational risk 
measures, assets per employee (ASSETPEREMP) and expenses per employee 
                                                          
15 The coefficient on ALLOWLNLOSSTL is significant at the 10% level, as indicated by the p-value of 0.069 
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(EXPENSEPEREMP).  Neither VEGA nor DELTA is significant in the estimation of these two 
operational risk measures.  Furthermore, neither ASSETPEEMP nor EXPENSEPEREMP is 
significant in the estimation of VEGA or DELTA.  One interesting result is the positive and 
significant coefficient on the Riegle-Neal indicator variable (DEREG).  The coefficient (942.36) 
is significant at the 5% level (p-value <.0001), indicating that firms have more assets per 
employee after the interstate branching deregulation.  These results indicate that managerial risk 
incentives do not affect the operation risk level of the bank.      
 Table 9 presents the results for the two interest rate risk measures, one year gap 
(ONEYRGAP) and the gap ratio (GAPRATIO).  The coefficients on VEGA and DELTA are 
insignificant in all equations.  The coefficients on ONEYRGAP and GAPRATIO are 
insignificant in the estimation of VEGA and the estimation of DELTA. 
 Table 10 displays the results for solvency risk as measured by the capital-asset ratio 
(CAPASSETRATIO).  Neither VEGA nor DELTA is a significant determinant of 
CAPASSETRATIO, as indicated by the p-values, 0.504 and 0.246, respectively.  These results 
indicate that neither interest rate risk nor solvency risk are affected by managerial risk incentives.  
These risk classifications, along with operational risk, do not appear to be dimensions which the 
manager manipulates in order to maximize the value of stock options held.  However, the 
positive relationship between VEGA and measures of credit risk and the negative relationship 
between VEGA and bank liquidity measures, suggest that these two dimensions are the focus of 
the manager’s risk seeking actions. 
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Section V: Conclusions 
 In this paper I examine the relationship between risk incentives and risk taking behavior 
for a sample of 100 bank holding companies from the S&P1500 for the years 1992 through 2003.  
I measure pay-for-risk sensitivities (Vega) and pay-for-performance sensitivities (Delta) using 
the one year approximation method of Core and Guay (2002).  I document a significant upward 
trend in risk incentives and a significant downward trend in performance incentives.  Vega has 
increased nearly five fold over the sample period from $87,181 in 1992 to $390,245 in 2003 
while Delta has fallen from a high of $150,361 in 1996 to $52,782 in 2003. 
 I investigate the relationship between risk incentives and solvency risk, as measured by 
bank capital-asset ratios.  While I document a negative relationship between Delta and the 
capital-asset ratio, I do not find a significant relationship between Vega and the capital-asset 
ratio.  Thus, the solvency dimension of bank risk is not one which managers are, or are able to 
manipulate in order to maximize the value of their stock options. 
 I analyze 16 other bank risk measurers beyond the capital-asset ratio, taking advantage of 
the regulatory environment of the banking industry which requires that banks report detailed 
information on their condition and income.  Using this information, I document that Vega is 
positively associated with measures of credit risk, including net charge offs, allowances for loan 
losses, and foreign commercial loans.  Furthermore, I documents that Vega is negatively 
associated with measure of bank liquidity, such as core deposit ratio and securities to loans.  I 
find that Vega is not significantly associated with measures of operational risk or interest rate 
risk.     
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 Taken together, these results suggest that managers do respond to risk incentives from 
option compensation and that regulators can benefit from the identification of areas of bank risk 
which managers influence in response to different types of compensation contracts.   
  
 
 59
References: 
Anderson, Ronald C., Thomas Bates, John Bizjak, and Michael Lemmon, 2000, Corporate 
Governance and Firm Diversification, Financial Management 29, 5-22. 
 
Bliss, Richard and Richard Rosen, 2001, CEO Compensation and Bank Mergers, Journal of 
Financial Economics 61, 107-138. 
 
Brewer, E., W. Hunter, and W. Jackson, 2004, Investment Opportunity Set, Product Mix, and the 
Relationship between Bank CEO Compensation and Risk-Taking, FRB of Atlanta Working 
Paper No. 2004-36. 
 
Bryan, S., LS. Hwang, and S. Lillein, 2005, CEO Compensation After Deregulation: The Case of 
Electric Utilities, Journal of Business 78, 1709-1752. 
 
Coles, J., N. Daniel, and L. Naveen, 2003, Executive Compensation and Managerial Risk-
Taking, Forthcoming Journal of Financial Economics. 
 
Core, John and Wayne Guay, 2002, Estimating the Value of Employee Stock Option Portfolios 
and their Sensitivities to Price and Volatility, Journal of Accounting Research 40, 613-630. 
 
Crawford, A. J., J. R. Ezzell, and J. A. Miles, 1995, Bank CEO Pay-Performance Relations and 
the Effects of Deregulation, Journal of Business 68, 231–256. 
 
Harjoto, M. and D.J. Mullineaux, 2003, The Impact of the Transformation of Banking on CEO 
Compensation, Journal of Financial Research 26, 341-354. 
 
Hausman, J. A., 1978, Specification Tests in Econometrics, Econometrica 46, 1251-1271. 
 
Hausman, J. A., 1983, Specification and Estimation of Simultaneous Equations Models, 
Handbook of Econometrics, Edited by Z. Griliches and M. Intriligator, Amsterdam: North 
Holland. 
 
Houston, Joel F. and Christopher James, 1995, CEO Compensation and Bank Risk: Is 
Compensation in Banking Structured to Promote Risk Taking?, Journal of Monetary Economics 
36, 405-431.   
 
Koch, T. W. and McDonald, S. S., 2000, Bank Management, 4th Edition, Dryden Press 
 
Kwan, S and R.A. Eisenbeis, Bank Risk, 1997, Capitalization and Inefficiency, Journal of 
Financial Services Research 12, 117-131. 
 
Mishra, C. and J. Neilsen, 2000, Board Independence and Compensation Policies in Large Bank 
Holding Companies, Financial Management 29, 51-69. 
 
 60
Rajgopal, S. and T. Shevlin, 2002, Empirical Evidence on the Relation Between Stock Option 
Compensation and Risk Taking, Journal of Accounting & Economics 33, 145-171. 
 
Rogers, D. A., 2002, Does Executive portfolio structure affect risk management? CEO Risk-
Taking Incentives and Corporate Derivative Usage, Journal of Banking and Finance 26, 271-
295. 
 
Stiroh, Kevin J. and Strahan, Philip E., 2003, Competitive Dynamics of Deregulation: Evidence 
from U.S. Banking, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 35, 801-828. 
 
 61
Figure 1 
Time Trends in Executive Wealth Sensitivities 
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This figure displays time trends in the average pay-for-risk sensitivity (Vega) and average pay-for-performance sensitivity (Delta) for a sample of 100 bank 
holding company CEO’s for the years 1992 through 2003. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for a Sample of 100 Bank Holding Companies 
 
 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Median 25th Percentile 75th Percentile
CAPASSETRATIO 588 0.082 0.015 0.081 0.073 0.091
VEGA 588 231855 479810 85413 35177 244350
DELTA 588 82355 305233 26023 12290 47689
SALARY 588 691.008 251.167 677.4 510 843.073
CEOTenure 588 2573.22 1900.35 2161 1010 3804
TOTASSETS 588 52.362 89.865 22.291 8.053 54.523
ROA 588 1.223 0.381 1.219 1.031 1.433
M2B 588 1.113 0.090 1.096 1.050 1.151
DEREG 588 0.728 0.445 1 0 1
LOANASSETS 588 0.621 0.105 0.643 0.571 0.686
REALESTLOANTL 588 0.542 0.192 0.541 0.426 0.649
SECLOANS 588 0.373 0.233 0.328 0.234 0.444
NETCHGOFFTL 588 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.006
NONPERFLOANTL 588 0.011 0.009 0.008 0.006 0.013
ALLOWLNLOSSTL 588 0.018 0.008 0.016 0.014 0.021
COMM_REALESTATE 588 0.791 0.136 0.789 0.715 0.875
DCOMMLOANTL 588 0.235 0.116 0.224 0.160 0.296
FCOMMLOANTL 588 0.014 0.037 0.000 0 0.003
COREDEPRATIO 588 0.800 0.181 0.859 0.779 0.906
BROKEREDDEPRATIO 428 0.006 0.029 0 0 0.001
FFPURCHRATIO 588 0.063 0.084 0.037 0.007 0.089
JCDSRATIO 588 0.113 0.078 0.094 0.067 0.133
ASSETPEREMP 588 3143.37 1247.48 2963.03 2208.06 3661.70
EXPENSEPEREMP 588 50.550 17.607 46.782 38.854 56.472
ONEYRGAP 588 10.899 21.601 2.969 0.833 12.774
GAPRATIO 588 2.052 1.411 1.838 1.308 2.517
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Table 2 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression: Determinants of Bank Capital-Asset Ratio 
 
 
Models:
CAPASSETRATIO = α1 + α2VEGA + α3DELTA + YEAR93-03
CAPASSETRATIO = α1 + α2VEGA+ α3DELTA + α4TOTASSETS + YEAR93-03
CAPASSETRATIO = α1 + α2VEGA + α3DELTA + α4TOTASSETS + α5ROA + YEAR93-03
CAPASSETRATIO = α1 + α2VEGA + α3DELTA + α4TOTASSETS + α5ROA + α6M2B + YEAR93-03
CAPASSETRATIO = α1 + α2VEGA + α3DELTA + α4TOTASSETS + α5ROA + α6M2B + α7LOANASSETS + YEAR93-03
CAPASSETRATIO = α1 + α2VEGA + α3DELTA + α4TOTASSETS + α5ROA + α6REALESTLOANTL + α7SECLOANS + YEAR93-03
CAPASSETRATIO = α1 + α2VEGA + α3DELTA + α4TOTASSETS + α5ROA + α6M2B + α7REALESTLOANTL + α8SECLOANS + YEAR93-03
CAPASSETRATIO = α1 + α2VEGA + α3DELTA+ α4TOTASSETS + α5ROA + α6M2B + α7LOANASSETS + α8REALESTLOANTL + α9SECLOANS + YEAR93-03
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Intercept 0.0723 0.0738 0.0623 0.0664 0.0455 0.0648 0.0672 0.0346
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
VEGA 1.16E-10 1.78E-09 1.28E-09 1.27E-09 1.39E-09 1.23E-09 1.22E-09 1.66E-09
(0.8991) (0.0108) (0.1277) (0.1340) (0.0947) (0.1523) (0.1557) (0.0334)
DELTA -4.03E-09 -4.27E-09 -4.41E-09 -4.40E-09 -4.29E-09 -4.37E-09 -4.37E-09 -3.93E-09
(-0.0001) (-0.0001) (-0.0001) (-0.0001) (-0.0001) (-0.0001) (-0.0001) (-0.0001)
TOTASSETS -2.48E-11 -2.07E-11 -2.09E-11 -1.78E-11 -2.43E-11 -2.44E-11 -1.26E-11
(-0.0001) (-0.0001) (-0.0001) (-0.0002) (-0.0001) (-0.0001) (-0.0155)
ROA 0.0137 0.0142 0.0128 0.0135 0.0138 0.0128
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
M2B -0.0043 0.0022 -0.0025 0.0011
(-0.6715) (0.8332) (0.8102) (0.9147)
LOANASSETS 0.0259 0.0435
(0.0001) (0.0001)
REALESTLOANTL -0.0011 -0.0012 -0.0050
(-0.7907) (-0.7794) (-0.2203)
SECLOANS -0.0049 -0.0048 0.0101
(-0.115) (-0.1264) (0.0192)  
 
Continued on next page. 
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Table 2 
continued 
 
 
D93 0.0064 0.0060 0.0022 0.0020 0.0023 0.0027 0.0026 0.0017
(0.0226) (0.0231) (0.3486) (0.3993) (0.2727) (0.2458) (0.2772) (0.4288)
D94 0.0052 0.0047 0.0010 0.0007 0.0008 0.0015 0.0013 0.0001
0.0604 0.0740 0.6666 0.7503 0.6938 0.5060 0.5592 0.9741
D95 0.0123 0.0119 0.0070 0.0069 0.0061 0.0072 0.0072 0.0057
(0.0604) (0.0740) (0.6666) (0.7503) (0.6938) (0.5060) (0.5592) (0.9741)
D96 0.0103 0.0098 0.0044 0.0045 0.0032 0.0045 0.0046 0.0028
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0555) (0.0542) (0.1297) (0.0498) (0.0491) (0.1740)
D97 0.0110 0.0105 0.0043 0.0047 0.0027 0.0044 0.0047 0.0027
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0999) (0.0935) (0.2841) (0.0964) (0.1046) (0.2933)
D98 0.0119 0.0108 0.0051 0.0055 0.0037 0.0055 0.0057 0.0035
(0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0712) (0.0690) (0.1897) (0.0505) (0.0574) (0.2299)
D99 0.0064 0.0059 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0020 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0023
(0.0415) (0.0530) (-0.813) (-0.8407) (-0.1897) (-0.9166) (-0.9358) (-0.3896)
D00 0.0115 0.0106 0.0052 0.0055 0.0032 0.0053 0.0055 0.0032
(0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0501) (0.0458) (0.2164) (0.0472) (0.0484) (0.2143)
D01 0.0123 0.0117 0.0067 0.0069 0.0061 0.0072 0.0073 0.0064
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0191) (0.0196) (0.0304) (0.0186) (0.0212) (0.0305)
D02 0.0153 0.0146 0.0072 0.0072 0.0074 0.0080 0.0080 0.0078
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0171) (0.0176) (0.0092) (0.0141) (0.0142) (0.0104)
D03 0.0155 0.0152 0.0085 0.0087 0.0086 0.0096 0.0096 0.0085
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0061) (0.0056) (0.0042) (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0059)
N 588 588 588 588 588 588 588 588
R-squared 0.0726 0.0922 0.2051 0.2054 0.2358 0.2107 0.2108 0.2467
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Table 3 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression: Determinants of Changes in Bank Capital-Asset Ratio 
 
 
Models:
dCAPASSETRATIO = α1 + α2dVEGA + α3DELTA + YEAR94-03
dCAPASSETRATIO = α1 + α2dVEGA + α3DELTA + α4TOTASSETS + YEAR94-03
dCAPASSETRATIO = α1 + α2dVEGA + α3DELTA + α4TOTASSETS + α5ROA + YEAR94-03
dCAPASSETRATIO = α1 + α2dVEGA + α3DELTA + α4TOTASSETS + α5ROA + α6M2B + YEAR94-03
dCAPASSETRATIO = α1 + α2dVEGA + α3DELTA + α4TOTASSETS + α5ROA + α6LOANASSETS + YEAR94-03
dCAPASSETRATIO = α1 + α2dVEGA + α3DELTA + α4TOTASSETS + α5ROA + α6M2B + α7LOANASSETS + α8REALESTLOANTL + α9SECLOANS + YEAR94-03
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Intercept 0.00547 0.00577 0.00326 0.00864 0.00059873 0.00152
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
dVEGA 5.88.E-11 9.90.E-11 1.43.E-10 1.21.E-10 1.39.E-10 1.54.E-10
(.9298) (.8811) (.8268) (.8560) (.8304) (.8165)
DELTA 7.32E-10 6.60E-10 6.70E-10 6.92E-10 6.83E-10 8.44E-10
(.3669) (.4149) (.4338) (.4150) (.4036) (.3219)
TOTASSETS -4.42E-12 -3.97E-12 -4.22E-12 -3.35E-12 -1.70E-12
(-.1969) (-.2498) (-.2212) (-.3435) (-.6592)
ROA 0.00227 0.00299 0.00216 0.00282
(.1287) (.1627) (.1569) (.1945)
M2B -0.00596 -0.00558
(-.4531) (-.4765)
LOANASSETS 0.00466 0.01039
(.2598) (.1175)
REALESTLOANTL -0.0021
(-.6225)
SECLOANS 0.004
(.2512)
YEAR DUMMIES Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 489 489 489 489 489 489
R-squared 0.0926 0.0949 0.1041 0.1059 0.107 0.1128  
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Table 4 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression: Determinants of Vega 
 
 
Models:
VEGA = α1 + α2CAPASSETRATIO + α3DELTA + YEAR93-03
VEGA = α1 + α2CAPASSETRATIO + α3DELTA + α4TOTASSETS + YEAR93-03
VEGA = α1 + α2CAPASSETRATIO + α3DELTA + α4TOTASSETS + α5ROA + YEAR93-03
VEGA = α1 + α2CAPASSETRATIO + α3DELTA + α4TOTASSETS + α5ROA + α6M2B + YEAR93-03
VEGA = α1 + α2CAPASSETRATIO + α3DELTA + α4TOTASSETS + α5ROA + α6M2B + α7LOANASSETS + YEAR93-03
VEGA = α1 + α2CAPASSETRATIO + α3DELTA + α4TOTASSETS + α5ROA + α6LOANASSETS + YEAR93-03
VEGA = α1 + α2CAPASSETRATIO + α3DELTA + α4TOTASSETS + α5ROA + α6M2B + α7REALESTLOANTL + α8SECLOANS + YEAR93-03
VEGA = α1 + α2CAPASSETRATIO + α3DELTA + α4TOTASSETS + α5ROA + α6M2B + α7LOANASSETS + α8REALESTLOANTL + α9SECLOANS + YEAR93-03
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Intercept 82246 -156042 -161378 -27580 60544 -109213 -74104 288780
(0.0001) (-0.0001) (-0.0001) (-0.0001) 0.0001 (-0.0001) (-0.0001) 0.0001
CAPASSETRATIO 123734 1693101 1393824 1381059 1563372 1556655 1331886 1882267
(0.9010) (0.0473) (0.2765) (0.2806) (0.2412) (0.2414) (0.3011) (0.1663)
DELTA -0.0990 -0.0624 -0.0640 -0.0638 -0.0635 -0.0637 -0.0678 -0.0704
(-0.003) (-0.0229) (-0.0136) (-0.0143) (-0.0106) (-0.0103) (-0.0153) (-0.0065)
TOTASSETS 0.0019 0.0019 0.0019 0.0018 0.0019 0.0019 0.0017
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
ROA 32811 49105 53145 33276 44653 48936
(0.6103) (0.4619) (0.4164) (0.6040) (0.4973) (0.4538)
M2B -139667 -169770 -100892 -142582
(-0.535) (-0.4504) (-0.6439) (-0.5158)
LOANASSETS -124418 -109471 -533789
(-0.1923) (-0.2551) (-0.0018)
REALESTLOANTL 77435 123927
(0.2680) (0.0923)
SECLOANS -50976 -230922
(-0.2665) (-0.0036)  
 
Continued on next page. 
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Table 4 
continued 
 
 
D93 3516 18714 11263 5476 3691 10790 7620 17266
(0.8854) (0.5260) (0.7191) (0.8641) (0.9073) (0.7294) (0.8118) (0.6123)
D94 15861 43272 35742 28467 27960 36676 28915 43573
(0.6053) (0.2267) (0.3507) (0.4674) (0.4719) (0.3381) (0.4706) (0.2933)
D95 -3876 11024 3000 289 3181 6059 -4728 9502
(-0.8753) (0.7239) (0.9254) (0.9928) (0.9217) (0.8525) (-0.8837) (0.7821)
D96 54627 71533 61464 62923 68240 65866 55341 74202
(0.1868) (0.1213) (0.2182) (0.2075) (0.1777) (0.1927) (0.2581) (0.1455)
D97 138871 147163 135470 148657 157308 140581 134119 154938
(0.1173) (0.0744) (0.1070) (0.1157) (0.0987) (0.0953) (0.1546) (0.1065)
D98 237712 271458 260963 273613 281069 265125 258977 282047
(0.0446) (0.0232) (0.0561) (0.0526) (0.0503) (0.0548) (0.0565) (0.0418)
D99 166954 175863 161735 164783 171513 167079 151584 176313
(0.0218) (0.0190) (0.0457) (0.0450) (0.0396) (0.0411) (0.0599) (0.0328)
D00 169101 198742 188857 197989 208078 196002 179518 203554
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
D01 232953 226920 218230 224691 226959 219001 208378 213922
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
D02 311167 296942 283292 282385 279593 281008 267949 264146
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
D03 302385 266005 254444 259207 257698 252213 246149 253614
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
N 588 588 588 588 588 588 588 588
R-squared 0.0603 0.1779 0.1785 0.1788 0.1794 0.179 0.1800 0.185
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Table 5 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression: Determinants of Changes in Vega 
 
 
Models:
dVEGA = α1 + α2dCAPASSETRATIO + α3DELTA + YEAR94-03
dVEGA = α1 + α2dCAPASSETRATIO + α3DELTA + α4TOTASSETS + YEAR94-03
dVEGA = α1 + α2dCAPASSETRATIO + α3DELTA + α4TOTASSETS + α5ROA + YEAR94-03
dVEGA = α1 + α2dCAPASSETRATIO + α3DELTA + α4TOTASSETS + α5ROA + α6M2B + YEAR94-03
dVEGA = α1 + α2dCAPASSETRATIO + α3DELTA + α4TOTASSETS + α5ROA + α6LOANASSETS + YEAR94-03
dVEGA = α1 + α2dCAPASSETRATIO + α3DELTA + α4TOTASSETS + α5ROA + α6M2B + α7LOANASSETS + α8REALESTLOANTL + α9SECLOANS + YEAR94-03
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Intercept 37016 -19324 11740 179691 3715 239234
(.0001) (-.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
dCAPASSETRATIO -169623 278401 406398 342547 396559 440218
(-.9306) (.8785) (.8230) (.8533) (.8267) (.8119)
DELTA -0.04465 -0.03097 -0.03117 -0.03042 -0.03113 -0.03347
(-.0685) (-.1584) (-.1714) (-.1809) (-.1742) (-.1753)
TOTASSETS 0.00078 0.00077 0.00076 0.00077 0.00073
(.0083) (.0086) (.0083) (.0089) (.0135)
ROA -28765 -6014.6 -29074 -7351.0
(-.6388) (-.9274) (-.6330) (-.9116)
M2B -185727 -170470
(-.4260) (-.4682)
LOANASSETS 14101 -111834
(.8948) (-.4862)
REALESTLOANTL 45569
(.5752)
SECLOANS -66856
(-.4802)
YEAR DUMMIES Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 489 489 489 489 489 489
R-squared 0.0307 0.0576 0.0581 0.0588 0.0581 0.0593  
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Table 6 
Simultaneous Estimation Results of Credit Risk Measures, Delta, and Vega 
 
 
coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value
Intercept 0.012 0.110 110762.8 0.481 -893311 -0.810 Intercept 0.038 0.001 43282.650 0.129 -546989.000 -0.941
NetChgOff -1.93E+07 -0.580 -1.02E+07 -0.949 NonPerfLoanTL -1.62E+06 -0.311 -8446358 -0.942
Vega 2.35E-08 0.046 -0.103 -0.576 Vega 2.66E-08 0.138 -0.044 -0.376
Delta 1.47E-07 0.540 -66.731 -0.652 Delta -2.46E-07 -0.500 -58.999 -0.737
ROA -0.004 -0.096 -71074.600 -0.608 ROA -0.004 -0.286 -5816.330 -0.671
TotAssets -2.74E-11 -0.225 0.000 0.582 0.002 0.551 TotAssets -2.75E-11 -0.423 0.000 0.413 0.002 0.497
CapAssetRatio -0.076 -0.162 -25121.900 -0.954 1931540 0.892 CapAssetRatio -0.130 -0.114 14944.870 0.950 1657745 0.911
Dereg -5.43E-03 -0.049 Dereg -0.010 -0.015
CEOTenure -6.14E-07 -0.212 -6.256 -0.647 86.058 0.710 CEOTenure -1.04E-07 -0.889 0.711 0.670 76.290 0.786
Salary 205.047 0.580 228.327 0.897 Salary 32.245 0.408 266.212 0.891
M2B 2710872 0.680 M2B 2202039 0.833
R-Squared 0.031 0.001 0.003 R-Squared 0.048 0.004 0.004
coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value
Intercept 0.032 <.0001 60251.020 0.245 -176586.000 -0.982 Intercept 0.858 0.012 323462.300 0.499 -1269943 -0.696
AllowLNLossTL -3.05E+06 -0.430 -1.44E+07 -0.908 Comm_RealEstae_Loans -3.01E+05 -0.534 469620.700 0.934
Vega 1.83E-08 0.069 -0.114 -0.423 Vega -5.14E-07 -0.345 0.153 0.561
Delta 5.68E-08 0.782 -36.850 -0.895 Delta -1.00E-05 -0.349 -51.728 -0.816
ROA -0.001 -0.509 -3833.270 -0.807 ROA 0.064 0.532 19308.110 0.468
TotAssets -1.75E-11 -0.364 0.000 0.437 0.002 0.305 TotAssets 6.36E-10 0.541 0.000 0.565 0.002 0.455
CapAssetRatio -0.103 -0.026 125300.800 0.711 1536290 0.880 CapAssetRatio 1.474 0.555 -351483 -0.614 2112993 0.835
Dereg -0.011 <-.0001 Dereg 0.193 0.131
CEOTenure -4.65E-07 -0.269 0.296 0.899 44.749 0.915 CEOTenure 2.30E-05 0.320 3.704578 0.449 66.141 0.848
Salary 62.818 0.455 355.652 0.852 Salary -113.634 -0.547 274.047 0.878
M2B 1315149 0.924 M2B 2181899 0.816
R-Squared 0.102 0.003 0.010 R-Squared 0.009 0.002 0.005
Delta Vega
AllowLNLossTL Delta
NetChgOff Delta Vega NonPerfLoanTL
Vega Delta VegaComm_RealEstae_Loans
 
 
Continued on next page. 
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Table 6 
continued 
 
 
coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value
Intercept 0.561 0.205 344325.200 0.650 -1100844 -0.587 Intercept 0.220 0.016 3072971 0.978 -2141597 -0.931
RealEstLoansTL -3.93E+05 -0.675 424867.900 0.931 DCommLoanTL -1.86E+07 -0.979 4474577 0.965
Vega -8.41E-07 -0.233 0.254849 0.686 Vega 1.72E-07 0.238 -1.631 -0.979
Delta -1.00E-05 -0.372 -49.640 -0.833 Delta 1.73E-06 0.558 -97.237 -0.890
ROA 0.067293 0.612 26519.310 0.629 ROA 0.012 0.652 228399.100 0.978
TotAssets 1.08E-09 0.422 0.000 0.687 0.002 0.456 TotAssets -3.17E-10 -0.254 0.000 0.978 0.002 0.873
CapAssetRatio 2.226 0.492 -636751 -0.699 2177524 0.820 CapAssetRatio -0.046 -0.945 11588436 0.979 70749.550 0.999
Dereg 2.81E-01 0.090 Dereg -0.049 -0.151
CEOTenure 4.20E-05 0.150 10.806 0.644 56.780 0.895 CEOTenure -2.00E-05 -0.010 -241.940 -0.979 189.857 0.933
Salary -216.036 -0.678 325.602 0.884 Salary 1776.296 0.979 -250.671 -0.979
M2B 2076807 0.836 M2B 3991397 0.885
R-Squared 0.011 0.001 0.005 R-Squared 0.024 0.000 0.001
coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value
Intercept 0.076 0.108 45145.680 0.244 -816144 -0.853
FCommLoanTL -1.38E+06 -0.439 -2233241 -0.946
Vega 1.55E-07 0.041 -0.072 -0.449
Delta 7.04E-07 0.647 -63.466 -0.678
ROA -0.016 0.272 -21642.300 -0.551
TotAssets -1.31E-10 -0.365 0.000 0.442 0.002 0.607
CapAssetRatio -0.707 -0.042 -237934 -0.594 1432917 0.938
Dereg -0.039 -0.028
CEOTenure -4.23E-06 -0.181 -2.968 -0.603 78.684 0.777
Salary 105.716 0.446 283.152 0.902
M2B 2532616 0.736
R-Squared 0.050 0.003 0.003
FCommLoanTL Delta
RealEstLoansTL Delta
Vega
Delta VegaVega DCommLoanTL
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Table 7 
Simultaneous Estimation Results of Liquidity Risk Measures, Delta, and Vega 
 
 
coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value
Intercept 0.514 0.009 -229461 -0.591 -2756291 -0.948 Intercept 0.095 0.388 140560.9 0.399 -2353199 -0.948
CoreDepRatio 3.77E+05 0.546 2152247 0.968 BrokeredDep -1718164 -0.486 28655344 0.946
Vega -6.50E-07 -0.037 0.077 0.609 Vega -3.98E-08 -0.645 0.079 0.746
Delta -4.22E-07 -0.947 -106.434 -0.915 Delta -1.61E-06 -0.608 15.910 0.936
ROA 0.026393 0.652 -9974.530 -0.729 ROA -0.002 -0.885 336.693 0.986
TotAssets 1.02E-09 0.088 0.000 0.587 0.001 0.849 TotAssets 5.61E-11 0.755 0.000 0.735 0.001 0.531
CapAssetRatio 3.258 0.023 -794991 -0.567 -1574332 -0.988 CapAssetRatio -0.278 -0.497 -788087 -0.541 12279036 0.932
Dereg 0.084 0.249 Dereg
CEOTenure 1.20E-05 0.343 -2.958 -0.685 119.076 0.878 CEOTenure 2.16E-06 0.738
Salary 62.056 0.568 537.175 0.956 Salary -61.710 -0.675 875.131 0.883
M2B 4124635 0.901 M2B 124344.4 0.988
R-Squared 0.022 0.002 0.001 R-Squared 0.005 0.002 0.024
coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value
Intercept 0.242 0.131 -90100 -0.565 -726303 -0.896
SecLoans 2.82E+05 0.445 -703939 -0.946
Vega -4.44E-07 -0.083 0.022 0.713
Delta 1.02E-06 0.845 -63.704 -0.676
ROA -0.053 -0.270 14952.730 0.380
TotAssets 3.35E-10 0.494 0.000 0.653 0.001 0.685
CapAssetRatio 2.137 0.070 -334599 -0.542 2781227 0.832
Dereg 0.069 0.248
CEOTenure 3.61E-06 0.736 0.025 0.992 89.284 0.671
Salary 38.163 0.511 25.069 0.991
M2B 2710833 0.666
R-Squared 0.040 0.002 0.003
VegaVega
Vega
BrokeredDep Delta
SecLoans Delta
CoreDepRatio Delta
 
 
Continued on next page. 
 72
Table 7 
continued 
 
 
coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value
Intercept 0.089 0.405 -27480.5 -0.635 -1095221 -0.739 Intercept 0.250 0.084 238716.900 0.619 -1024191 -0.264
FFPurchRatio 227077.1 0.303 -1244560 -0.958 JCDRatio -6.99E+05 -0.657 1966672 0.849
Vega 4.13E-08 0.809 -0.044 -0.372 Vega -1.05E-07 -0.650 0.231 0.670
Delta 3.37E-06 0.333 -81.198 -0.796 Delta -4.43E-06 -0.345 -21.717 -0.930
ROA -0.039 -0.222 8929.911 0.325 ROA 0.007 0.871 4923.161 0.799
TotAssets 6.07E-11 0.853 0.000 0.624 0.002 0.743 TotAssets -9.11E-12 -0.984 -0.0004 -0.667 0.002 0.130
CapAssetRatio -1.507 -0.056 430397.5 0.360 187244.2 0.997 CapAssetRatio -0.334 -0.753 -1018413 -0.669 3585811 0.633
Dereg 0.028 0.479 Dereg 0.082 0.129
CEOTenure -5.04E-06 -0.480 1.489 0.359 108.816 0.798 CEOTenure 3.73E-06 0.698 -0.451 -0.930 34.374 0.911
Salary 12.608 0.630 88.638 0.964 Salary -112.147 -0.668 360.159 0.760
M2B 3549197 0.816 M2B 1004434 0.919
R-Squared 0.027 0.004 0.002 R-Squared 0.016 0.001 0.026
Delta VegaFFPurchRatio Delta Vega JCDRatio
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Table 8 
Simultaneous Estimation Results of Operational Risk Measures, Delta, and Vega 
 
 
coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value
Intercept 3199.626 <.0001 -136468 -0.618 -1254134 -0.880 Intercept 52.141 0.017 -85613.400 -0.529 -1310324 -0.939
AssetPerEmp 32.080 0.545 -194.844 -0.975 ExpensePerEmp 1.57E+03 0.397 -47939.900 -0.986
Vega 4.99E-04 0.618 -0.176 -0.537 Vega 4.90E-05 0.158 -0.095 -0.394
Delta -3.27E-03 -0.873 -138.850 -0.952 Delta 5.57E-04 0.429 -242.699 -0.981
ROA -420.363 -0.026 13473.090 0.495 ROA -3.220 -0.621 5047.088 0.617
TotAssets 7.00E-08 0.971 0.000 0.547 0.002 0.899 TotAssets -5.10E-08 -0.442 0.000 0.436 0.003 0.971
CapAssetRatio -3.84E+03 -0.403 537395 0.575 993139.100 0.985 CapAssetRatio -246.160 -0.123 433170 0.451 -5215807 -0.990
Dereg 942.365 <.0001 Dereg 2.196 0.787
CEOTenure 0.034 0.410 0.509 0.861 192.495 0.954 CEOTenure -3.05E-03 -0.036 4.962 0.312 217.090 0.976
Salary 59.149 0.570 -95.516 -0.991 Salary 6.737 0.819 291.327 0.975
M2B 5934126 0.953 M2B 11189508 0.981
R-Squared 0.144 0.002 0.001 R-Squared 0.037 0.003 0.000
Delta VegaAssetPerEmp Delta Vega ExpensePerEmp
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Table 9 
Simultaneous Estimation Results of Interest Rate Risk Measures, Delta, and Vega 
 
 
coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value
Intercept -7309590 -0.232 37503.910 0.480 -770912 -0.870 Intercept 1.979 0.153 -76600.9 -0.665 -2680505 -0.958
OneYRGap 0.013 0.623 0.022 0.943 GAPRatio 5.55E+04 0.547 661602.9 0.975
Vega -13.087 -0.180 -0.097 -0.620 Vega 1.70E-06 0.442 0.064 0.627
Delta -63.898 -0.747 -59.934 -0.725 Delta 3.80E-05 0.403 -134.910 -0.950
ROA 1478327 0.420 -18831 -0.716 ROA 0.105 0.800 -5828.71 -0.801
TotAssets 0.249 <.0001 -0.003 -0.624 -0.004 -0.960 TotAssets -1.65E-09 -0.697 0.000 0.615 0.001 0.831
CapAssetRatio 8.15E+07 0.069 -357884 -0.689 1084843 0.960 CapAssetRatio -11.101 -0.274 208821.4 0.687 6101030 0.959
Dereg 3.90E+06 0.088 Dereg -0.536 -0.300
CEOTenure -262.905 -0.519 5.994 0.565 88.989 0.654 CEOTenure -1.60E-04 -0.093 7.032 0.489 249.781 0.960
Salary 97.068 0.630 275.254 0.895 Salary -58.209 -0.584 -469.726 -0.981
M2B 2382629 0.781 M2B 5036221 0.943
R-Squared 0.782 0.001 0.004 R-Squared 0.012 0.002 0.001
Delta VegaOneYRGap Delta Vega GAPRatio
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Table 10 
Simultaneous Estimation Results of Solvency Risk Measures, Delta, and Vega 
 
 
coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value
Intercept 0.071 <.0001 6035103 0.958 -1145303 -0.702
CapAssetRatio -8.40E+07 -0.958 4343271 0.896
Vega -2.48E-08 -0.246 1.034 0.959
Delta -2.77E-07 -0.504 -67.930 -0.651
ROA 0.018 <.0001 1374020 0.958
TotAssets 2.41E-11 0.544 -0.002 -0.959 0.002 0.556
Dereg 0.007 0.149
CEOTenure -1.21E-08 -0.989 -30.427 -0.960 92.563 0.677
Salary -1081.060 -0.958 153.860 0.907
M2B 2782642 0.664
R-Squared 0.077 0.000 0.003
CapAssetRatio Delta Vega
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Implementing a Market Trading Strategy Based upon Executive Option Grants 
Essay Three 
 
Introduction:  
This study investigates the profitability of a trading strategy that exploits the relationship 
between executive stock option grants and stock returns.  This relationship is characterized by 
negative returns preceding the date of an executive stock option award and positive returns 
following it.  Managers have incentives to create such a “return smile” given current accounting 
rules regarding the expensing of executive stock options and the impact those rules have on the 
determination of strike prices.  Under GAAP, companies deduct the intrinsic value of options 
granted from net income as compensation expense.  This intrinsic value is defined as the 
difference between the strike price of the option and the market price of the stock on the date of 
the option grant.  Thus if the strike price is set at the market price of the stock, there is no 
reduction in net income.  Setting the strike price at the market price of the stock creates the 
incentive for the manager to undertake actions to (temporarily) reduce stock price and thereby 
obtaining a lower option strike price.1  Once the option is granted and the strike value set, the 
manager’s incentive changes, and a higher share value is preferred.  These temporally opposed 
incentives create the “return smile.”  I suggest a strategy by which investors can take advantage 
of these opposed incentives and the predictable pattern of returns they produce.      
                                                          
1 The strike is the price the manager will pay to the firm upon exercise of the option.  Thus, all else constant, the 
manager prefers a lower strike price.   
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To implement a trading strategy, the date of the stock option grant must be known – or at 
least foreseeable – before the fact, or the grant must be observable at the time it is made.  Most 
firms, however, do not publicly announce upcoming executive stock option grants nor is the 
grant observable when it is awarded.  I therefore rely on SEC mandated, after-the-fact 
disclosures of option grant dates to identify a sub-sample of firms with fixed option grant dates.  
I take a short position in these firms' stocks just before the anticipated (unobservable) option 
grant, and reverse that position immediately after the anticipated (unobservable) option grant.  
The abnormal returns from this trading strategy are in excess of 2.5% over the 100-day holding 
period. 
In the following section, I discuss institutional background and a brief review of relevant 
literature.  Section II describes the trading classification and data.  Empirical methodology is 
described in Section III.  Section IV contains the empirical results verifying the persistence of the 
return smile and presents results on the profitability of the trading strategy.  Section V concludes.    
 
Section I:  Background 
 Yermack (1997) and Aboody and Kasznik (2000) provide strong evidence that stock 
option grants are followed by positive abnormal returns and moderate evidence that they are 
preceded by negative abnormal returns.  Yermack (1997) finds that the positive abnormal returns 
begin to accumulate immediately after the grant, that they equal 1.18% fifteen trading days (three 
weeks) after the award, and that they reach a maximum of 3.42% after approximately 50 trading 
days (ten weeks).  Yermack (1997) also finds negative abnormal returns prior to the grant date, 
although these returns are statistically insignificant.  Based upon his results, Yermack (1997) 
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concludes that executives exert pressure on the compensation committee to time the option grant; 
that is, to grant options just after “bad news” and/or just before “good news.”   
 Aboody and Kasznik (2000) point out that this conclusion can be maintained only for 
those firms that have varying option award dates.  In contrast, they suggest that firms time news 
announcements around option grant awards.2  Aboody and Kasznik (2000) document positive 
abnormal returns of 1.67% one month after the award which continue to increase, reaching a 
level of 4.0% after 3 months.  They further find a significant negative abnormal return of –1.78% 
for the 30 days preceding the option grant for firms with unscheduled grants.    
 Both Yermack (1997) and Aboody and Kasznik (2000) thus document a so-called smile 
in abnormal returns around stock option grants.  The main difference in the explanation of the 
return smile centers on that which is fixed and that which is variable.  Yermack (1997) argues 
that the news event is fixed and that the option grant date is timed, whereas Aboody and Kasznik 
(2000) argue that the option grant date is fixed and the news release is timed.  Either way, the 
abnormal returns smile suggests that it may be possible to devise a profitable trading strategy 
around stock option grant dates.  This study investigates that possibility.   
To implement a trading strategy, the stock option grant date must be either (1) known ex 
ante, (2) foreseeable, or (3) observable at the time the grant is made.  Firms, however, 
traditionally do not publicly announce upcoming executive stock option grants.  Also, stock 
option grants are not publicly observable at the time of the award.  I therefore rely on ex post 
firm disclosures, mandated by the SEC, to identify a subsample of firms for which the grant date 
may be foreseeable. 
                                                          
2 Yermack’s conclusion would require that compensation committees collude with the executive.  This is unlikely 
since most compensation committees are comprised of “outside” board members.   If firms want to deduct executive 
compensation exceeding $1million, IRS §162 (m) states that the company needs such a committee (Murphy, 1999). 
 79
The SEC passed a rule, effective in 1992, which mandates that firms disclose, in their 
annual statements, the stock options that they granted to their executives.  Because these annual 
statements are typically released between three and eighteen months after the actual grant, the 
market has no advance notice.3  The option-related, after-the-fact  disclosures, however, include 
details about the approximate timing of the grant.  A significant number of firms, it turns out, 
award stock options at an approximately fixed date each year.   I assess the profitability of a 
trading strategy around the anticipated (fixed) stock option grant date for this subsample of 
firms.  Of course, since the stock option grant date is approximately fixed for these firms, the 
market may also anticipate the award and arbitraged away the abnormal returns around the 
option grant date.  In that case, the trading strategy would not be profitable.  Stated differently, 
the assessment of the profitability of a trading strategy also represents a test of whether the 
market uses the ex post option related disclosures to anticipate future grants.  
In this paper I add to the literature in a number of ways.  First, I address whether 
significant abnormal returns persist today.  If investors have learned a strategy to take advantage 
of this, then abnormal returns should no longer exist for firms which have fixed award 
schedules.4  Second, I devise a trading strategy which takes advantage of the predictability in 
firm returns based upon stock option grants. Using a very simple model, trading is based upon 
forecasting forward one year from the previous (and ex post observed) option grant.  This trading 
strategy produces abnormal profits which are in excess of typical transaction costs.  
 
                                                          
3 Aboody and Kasznik (2000) note that executive option awards remain undisclosed and are ultimately disclosed in 
the proxy statement.  Although firms can publicly disclose grants, few do so. 
4 Investors would be unable to implement the trading strategy for firms with non-fixed award schedules.   
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Section II:  Data and Trading Classification 
The option data for this study come from the Compustat Execucomp database.  The 
returns data come from the CRSP (Center for Research on Security Prices) daily stock file.  
Abnormal returns are calculated from individual firm returns and the CRSP Value Weighted 
Index returns.   The Execucomp sample covers S&P 1500 firms.  I use data for the years 1992 
through 2001.  There are 10,171 total firm observations which have complete option grant 
information from Execucomp and returns from the CRSP tapes.  The Execucomp data provide 
detailed information about top-management compensation packages, including information 
about stock option grants, collected from annual statements.  The database does not provide 
information about the date on which the option grant took place.  However, simplifying 
assumptions are made about the option grant date by observing the option expiration date.5   
Firms are classified as either fixed grantors or non-fixed grantors by observing the year to 
year pattern of grant dates.  For a firm to be classified as fixed it must establish a history of 
granting options on the same day, year to year.  Since grant dates can move due to weekends, 
holidays, and the like, a +/- 30-day window is allowed.  Grants are then placed into one of two 
categories:  1) fixed grant or 2) non-fixed grant.  A firm is considered fixed if it establishes a 
minimum of a four year history of granting within the window.6   Table 1 provides statistics on 
the distribution of the 2,326 fixed grants and the 8,282 non-fixed grants.   
To implement a trading strategy based upon option grants, future grant dates on which to 
base trades must be forecasted with reasonable certainty.  Therefore, I require a firm to establish 
                                                          
5 For example: A 1995 annual report discloses an option being granted to a manager with an expiration date of 
December 31st, 2005, the grant date is then assumed to be December 31st, 1995.  This assumption has validity 
because of the empirical observation that the majority of options are granted at-the-money and with 10 years until 
maturity.     
6 See Figure 9 for examples.   
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a four year history of granting inside the window before any trading will occur.7  Once this 
history is established, the trading strategy forecasts forward one year from the last grant date.  
This date is then used as the “buy” date.  Table 2 displays the distribution of 1,092 strategy 
trades by year and by month.  These results indicate that there are approximately 200 trades per 
year8 and that over half the total trades occur in the months of December, January, and February.   
Note that there are relatively few trades in 1996 and none in the years prior.  Since the 
Execucomp data begins in 1992, and since I require a four year history of fixed grants, no trading 
is possible prior to 1996.  Also, the Execucomp data is notably thin for the year 1992, hence the 
relatively few trades in 1996.    
The actual grant date may differ significantly from the forecasted grant date.   However, 
trading occurs based upon the forecasted grant date (not the actual grant date) to avoid look-
ahead bias.  Comparing Table 1 with Table 2, it should be noted that the number of strategy 
trades in 2001 (N=201) is higher than the number of fixed grants in 2001 (N=177).  The 
corporate scandals of 2000 and 2001 had the effect of decreasing the number of firms granting 
options in 2001.  The strategy forecasts grants for some firms which ultimately did not grant in 
2001.   
If a firm deviates from a history of a fixed grant date, the strategy will miss the date and 
trade on an incorrect forecast.  In order to avoid look-ahead bias, the strategy allows this to 
happen.  Of the total 1,092 strategy trades, trading on an incorrect date occurs 188 times.  After it 
is realized that the firm has deviated (months after deviation), the firm begins anew the process 
of establishing a fixed grant reputation.   
                                                          
7 Since a four year history is required and the Execucomp data begins in 1992, the earliest trading strategy return 
would be for the year 1996.   
8 Execucomp data is notably sparse for the year 1992, thus there are relatively fewer firms which establish 
themselves as fixed-grantors by the year 1996.     
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  In order to understand what happens when a firm does deviate, the trades which were 
incorrectly forecasted by the strategy are examined.  These include three types of trades: when 
the actual grant occurred prior to the forecasted grant (early), when the actual grant occurred 
after the forecasted grant (late), and when no grant occurred yet one was forecasted (no-grant).  
Within the 188 incorrect forecasts, these occurred 84, 67, and 37 times, respectively. 
 
Section III:  Methodology 
 I use the event study methodology to measure returns around option grants and to 
measure returns of the trading strategy.9  Both market model returns and market adjusted returns 
are used.  Both market model and market adjusted returns are calculated using the CRSP value-
weighted market index.  For the market model returns, model parameters (αi βi) are estimated 
over a 180 day period, starting 201 days prior to the event and ending 21 days prior to the event.  
This allows for a 20-day window prior to the event to avoid information leakage affecting the 
estimated Betas.   
Market model abnormal returns are calculated as:   
tiiitititit MarketRRRAR
^^^ βα −−=−=  
 
Market adjusted returns are calculated as: 
titit MarketRAR −=  
These daily abnormal returns are used to calculate average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs).  
Recent research suggests that buy-and-hold returns (BHARs) may be preferable because they 
capture actual changes in the value of investor portfolios (Barber and Lyon, 1997, and Lyon, 
Barber, and Tsai 1999).  I use CARs as the primary aggregate abnormal return in this study in 
                                                          
9 See Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay, 1997, for details on the event study methodology.   
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order to maintain comparability to prior studies of option grants and stock price behavior 
(Yermack, 1997 and Aboody and Kasznik, 2000).  However, for comparability to other event 
studies using buy-and-hold returns, BHARs are calculated and reported for a select number and 
length of event windows. 
 Abnormal returns are calculated for windows up to three years after the event in order to 
see both short term and long term effects of options grants.  Abnormal returns for the trading 
strategy are calculated for 120 after the forecasted grant date.  The CARi for a given firm is 
calculated as: 
∑=
windowevent
iti ARCAR  
while the average CAR for an event window is the average across all N firms: 
NCARCAR
N
i
i∑
=
=
1
 
 
Section IV:  Results 
A:  Persistence of Return Smile 
The first objective is to analyze the pattern of returns around option grants in order to verify the 
findings of prior research over my sample period.  If managers are manipulating information by 
timing the release of news (variable) around scheduled option grants (fixed) or if managers are 
manipulating the timing of the option grant (variable) around scheduled news releases (fixed), 
both should lead to a return smile around the option grant.  Figure 1 displays cumulative 
abnormal returns around all 10,171 option grants.   
As can be seen from Figure 1, the return smile exists with abnormal returns of 
approximately -1.0% for the 20 days preceding the grant and approximately 2.0% for the 20 days 
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following the grant.  Panel 1 of Table 3 displays the results for the pre-event market model 
CARs.  From day -20 to day -1 the market model CAR is -1.03% (t = -7.10), while the market 
model BHAR for this same time period is -1.20% (t = -8.28).  For the event window from day 
zero to day 80, market model CAR is 4.51% (t = 11.10) and market model BHAR is 2.89% (t = 
8.817).   
 To analyze the persistence of this pattern over time, results for sub-samples for the time 
periods 1992-1996 and 1997-2001 appear in Panels 2 and 3 of Table 3.10   Similar patterns of 
returns exist between these two sub-samples, although the magnitude of the effect appears to 
have increased over time.  The 80 day event window market model CAR for the 1992-1996 
subsample is 1.80% compared to 6.28% for the 1997-2001 subsample.  For these same sub-
samples, the market model BHARs are .74% and 4.29%, respectively.   
 The sample is further partitioned by whether the firm has a fixed grant schedule, granting 
on the same date year to year, or whether the firm has a variable grant schedule, granting on 
different days year to year.  A firm is considered to have a fixed granting schedule if it grants on 
the same day for a minimum of four years.  Figure 2 displays cumulative abnormal returns 
around all 2,326 fixed option grants.   
Table 4, Panel 1, shows the abnormal returns for fixed firms for the total sample period of 
1992-2001.  The 80 day event window market model CAR is 1.91% (t = 4.68) and the market 
model BHAR is 0.82% (t = 2.02).  The market adjusted CAR and BHAR are slightly higher at 
2.14% and 1.78%, respectively.   
 The sample is partitioned into two sub-samples, 1992-1996 and 1997-2001.  The results 
presented in Panels 2 and 3 of Table 4 indicate that the return smile around the option grant date 
has increased in magnitude over time.  For the 1992-1996 period, market models CAR for the 80 
                                                          
10 This sample partition is chosen based upon the end of the Aboody and Kasznik sample, 1996.  
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day event window is 0.33% while the BHAR is -0.44%.  Neither of these is statistically 
significant.  For the 1997-2001 period, the market model CAR (BHAR) is 3.48% (2.07%).  
These results indicate that investors have not learned the manager’s information management 
strategy when there is a fixed grant schedule.  If investors had, then abnormal returns would have 
been arbitraged away.  This also suggests that it is possible to create a trading strategy to take 
advantage of the return smile around award dates for fixed granting firms.  Since a trade date 
needs to be forecasted in order to trade, this can be done only for those firms with a fixed grant 
schedule.   
B: Trading Strategy Profitability 
 This section presents results of the trading strategy developed to take advantage of the 
documented persistence of the return smile around the date of executive stock option grants.  To 
prevent look-ahead bias, event day-zero for all trading strategies is the estimated date on which 
the strategy trades.  This is estimated for firms which establish a four year history of fixed option 
granting.  This is not the date of the actual grant, since this information is released long after the 
grant occurs.  These estimated dates are simply last year’s grant date + 365.  
 Figure 3 presents results for the 1,092 forecasted trades.   Based upon the results of Table 
5 (fixed, 1992-1996), a holding period of 80 trading days past the estimated date is assumed for 
the trading strategy.  Table 5 shows that the pre-event window market model CAR is 0.13% (t = 
.409) while the 80 day event window CAR is 2.55% (t=3.878).  Market model BHARs for the 
same windows are -0.33% (t = -0.908) and 1.07% (t = 1.672).   
The trading strategy can take advantage of both sides of the return smile by taking a short 
position prior to the estimated grant and reversing the position after the estimated grant.  Thus, 
the total strategy return is calculated from the event window return less the pre-event window 
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return.  This yields a trading strategy market model CAR of 2.42% and a market adjusted CAR 
of 3.37%.  The trading strategy market model BHAR is approximately 1.04% while the market 
adjusted BHAR is approximately 3.14%.   These results clearly indicate that a strategy can be 
developed using only forecasted option grant dates to take advantage of the documented return 
smile around executive stock option grants.   
 Although the prior results indicate that a profitable trading strategy can be devised based 
upon forecasted trade dates, it is informative to see what happens to returns when the trading 
strategy incorrectly forecasts.  There are a total of 1,092 trades reported in Table 5, which 
comprise the returns to the trading strategy.  For various reasons, a firm may deviate from an 
established history of granting options on a fixed date each year.11  Using historic or ‘look-back’ 
information, the results are examined when the strategy correctly or incorrectly predicts the grant 
date.  To examine the effects of a grant schedule change on the trading strategy, the 1,092 total 
strategy trades are partitioned into four groups:  on time grants (N=904), early grants12 (N=84), 
late grants13 (N=67), and no grants14 (N=37).  Figures 4 through 7 and Table 5 report the market 
model and market adjusted CARs for these four groups, respectively.  As can be seen from these 
figures, the trading strategy has superior performance when the grant date is correctly forecasted.  
Figure 4 displays the CARs for the case where the actual grant was earlier than the forecasted 
grant.  The actual grant would have preceded event time day -20, by definition of “early.”  
However, since the grant occurred early, the positive returns following option grants are accruing 
by day -20 and reach a local maximum on day +40.  Figure 5 displays the CARs when the 
strategy predicted a grant and the actual grant was later than predicted (in excess of 30 calendar 
                                                          
11 These reasons might include decreased ROA or stock price or a change in CEO around the time of the option 
grant.    
12 Earlier than the forecasted strategy date by more than 30 calendars days.   
13 Later than the forecasted strategy date by more than 30 calendars days.   
14 Where a grant was predicted and none happened that year.   
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days).  The pattern indicates that the return smile begins around day +39, reverses shortly 
afterward, and reaches a maximum on day +65.  This is a consistent pattern of returns based 
upon option grants given that the actual grant is later than the forecasted grant, thus the smile 
should occur after the forecasted date.  Since incorrect forecasts remain unknown until months 
after the trade, the strategy can not be refined based upon these results.  However, these results 
do strengthen the overall results of the profitability of the trading strategy in the sense that the 
strategy should perform better when trades are correctly forecasted. 
  
Section V:  Conclusions  
 In this paper, I investigate the profitability of a stock trading strategy which bases trades 
on executive stock option grants.  First, I verify the persistence of the return smile around the 
date of option grants.  This can be viewed as a test of whether the market has learned to use ex 
post information to time trades based upon future option grants. Partitioning my sample based 
upon time, I document that the return smile has increased in magnitude, indicating that market 
arbitrage is not occurring.   
 Since upcoming option grants are not publicly announced, I suggest a simple method by 
which firms with fixed option grants can be identified.  This method relies on readily available 
information garnered from SEC mandated, after-the-fact disclosures in the footnotes of annual 
reports.  Using this information I base trades on a one-year forward forecast from last years ex 
post observed grant.  This yields a total of 1,092 trades over the 6 year trading period (1996-
2001). 
 I take a short position in these firms' stocks 20 days prior to the forecasted (unobservable) 
option grant, and reverse that position immediately after the forecasted (unobservable) option 
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grant.  Holding the position for 80 trading days after the forecasted grant yields a strategy return 
in excess of 2.5%.  This holding period return is in excess of typical transactions costs.   
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Table 1 
Summary of 2,326 fixed and 8,282 non-fixed CEO stock option grants. 
 
 
Panel A: Stock option awards by year 
       
 Stock Option Awards - Fixed Stock Option Awards - non-Fixed 
Year   Number % of Total   Number % of Total 
1992  72 3.1  154 2.0 
1993  163 7.0  539 6.9 
1994  219 9.4  719 9.2 
1995  263 11.3  729 9.3 
1996  300 12.9  784 10.0 
1997  309 13.3  792 10.1 
1998  316 13.6  909 11.6 
1999  277 11.9  1042 13.3 
2000  230 9.9  1073 13.7 
2001  177 7.6  1104 14.1 
Total   2326 100.0   7845 100 
       
       
Panel B: Stock option awards by month 
       
 Stock Option Awards - Fixed Stock Option Awards - non-Fixed 
Month   Number % of Total   Number % of Total 
January  479 20.6  1232 15.7 
February  472 20.3  1115 14.2 
March  154 6.6  714 9.1 
April  149 6.4  660 8.4 
May  160 6.9  636 8.1 
June  114 4.9  431 5.5 
July  84 3.6  534 6.8 
August  112 4.8  408 5.2 
September  72 3.1  324 4.1 
October  123 5.3  511 6.5 
November  133 5.7  463 5.9 
December  274 11.8  817 10.4 
Total   2326 100.0   7845 100.0 
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Table 2 
Summary of 1,092 Estimated Stock Option Awards Based Upon Trading Strategy 
Forecasts, by Year and Month 
 
 
Panel A: Estimated stock option awards by year 
    
  
Year  Number % of Total 
1996 86 7.9% 
1997 176 16.1% 
1998 207 19.0% 
1999 214 19.6% 
2000 203 18.6% 
2001 206 18.9% 
Total  1092 100% 
    
    
Panel B: Estimated stock option awards by month 
    
  
Month  Number % of Total 
January 233 21.3% 
February 229 21.0% 
March 70 6.4% 
April 80 7.3% 
May 73 6.7% 
June 46 4.2% 
July 40 3.7% 
August 53 4.9% 
September 38 3.5% 
October 54 4.9% 
November 60 5.5% 
December 116 10.6% 
Total  1092  100% 
 
 
The trading strategy requires that a firm establish a four year history of “fixed” annual award dates.  Once this history is 
established, past awards are used to forecast future award dates.  I use these forecasts for the strategy trade date.   
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Table 3 
Abnormal Returns Surrounding the Date of Executive Stock Option Awards 
 
 
Panel 1: All option awards for years 1992-2001 (N=10,171)
Market 
Model
Market 
Adjusted
Market 
Model
Market 
Adjusted
(-20,-1) -1.03% (-7.101) *** -0.69% (-4.623) *** -1.20% (-8.276) *** -0.78% (-5.181) ***
(-1,0) -0.10% (-2.208) * -0.08% (-1.648) * -0.10% (-2.271) * -0.08% (-1.702) *
(0,+1) 0.33% (7.198) *** 0.39% (8.148) *** 0.33% (7.092) *** 0.38% (8.052) ***
(0,+40) 3.19% (13.913) *** 4.25% (18.157) *** 2.80% (12.035) *** 4.21% (18.022) ***
(0,+80) 4.51% (14.294) *** 6.51% (20.386) *** 2.89% (8.817) *** 6.40% (20.028) ***
(0, +120) 4.28% (11.100) *** 7.29% (18.751) *** 0.48% (0.415) 7.04% (18.098) ***
Panel 2: All option awards for years 1992-1996 (N=4,021)
Market 
Model
Market 
Adjusted
Market 
Model
Market 
Adjusted
(-20,-1) -0.54% (-3.534) *** -0.34% (-2.152) * -0.67% (-4.349) *** -0.42% (-2.685) **
(-1,0) -0.09% (-1.795) * -0.08% (-1.567) -0.09% (-1.810) * -0.08% (-1.578)
(0,+1) 0.12% (2.447) ** 0.14% (2.759) ** 0.11% (2.330) ** 0.13% (2.648) **
(0,+40) 1.53% (6.537) *** 2.06% (8.691) *** 1.20% (5.059) *** 1.91% (8.037) ***
(0,+80) 1.80% (5.502) *** 2.82% (8.555) *** 0.74% (2.047) * 2.47% (7.467) ***
(0, +120) 1.38% (3.351) *** 2.82% (6.978) *** -0.94% (-2.815) ** 2.13% (5.207) ***
Panel 3: All option awards for years 1997-2001 (N=6,150)
Market 
Model
Market 
Adjusted
Market 
Model
Market 
Adjusted
(-20,-1) -1.35% (-6.636) *** -0.93% (-4.361) *** -1.55% (-7.621) *** -1.01% (-4.756) ***
(-1,0) -0.11% (-1.721) * -0.08% (-1.169) -0.12% (-1.789) * -0.08% (-1.227)
(0,+1) 0.47% (7.285) *** 0.55% (8.183) *** 0.46% (7.217) *** 0.55% (8.125) ***
(0,+40) 4.27% (13.192) *** 5.67% (17.465) *** 3.83% (11.704) *** 5.72% (17.169) ***
(0,+80) 6.28% (14.269) *** 8.93% (19.680) *** 4.29% (9.390) *** 8.97% (19.786) ***
(0, +120) 6.18% (11.442) *** 10.21% (18.530) *** 1.39% (1.871) * 10.26% (18.620) ***
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs)
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs)
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs)
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Table 4 
Abnormal Returns Surrounding the Date of Fixed Executive Stock Option Awards 
 
 
Panel 1: All fixed option awards for years 1992-2001 (N=2,326)
Market 
Model
Market 
Adjusted
Market 
Model
Market 
Adjusted
(-20,-2) -0.42% (-2.104) * -0.42% (-2.069) * -0.51% (-2.595) ** -0.48% (-2.359) **
(-1,0) -0.03% (-0.507) -0.02% (-0.320) -0.03% (-0.519) -0.02% (-0.329)
(0,+1) 0.14% (2.248) * 0.16% (2.452) ** 0.14% (2.146) * 0.16% (2.356) **
(0,+40) 0.90% (3.115) *** 0.87% (2.898) ** 0.58% (1.984) * 0.72% (2.405) **
(0,+80) 1.91% (4.682) *** 2.14% (5.073) *** 0.82% (2.017) * 1.78% (4.217) ***
(0, +120) 1.75% (3.505) *** 2.12% (4.110) *** -0.49% (-0.976) 1.60% (3.102) ***
Panel 2: All fixed option awards for years 1992-1996 (N=1,159)
Market 
Model
Market 
Adjusted
Market 
Model
Market 
Adjusted
(-20,-2) -0.22% (-0.948) -0.01% (-0.039) -0.30% (-1.285) -0.07% (-0.281)
(-1,0) -0.03% (-0.390) 0.01% (0.102) -0.03% (-0.437) 0.00% (0.057)
(0,+1) 0.00% (0.020) 0.04% (0.514) -0.01% (-0.068) 0.04% (0.468)
(0,+40) 0.18% (0.533) 0.83% (2.332) ** -0.06% (-0.170) 0.70% (1.973) *
(0,+80) 0.33% (0.681) 1.70% (3.407) *** -0.44% (-0.906) 1.39% (2.798) **
(0, +120) 0.00% (0.007) 2.09% (3.439) *** -1.44% (-2.421) ** 1.71% (2.815) **
Panel 3: All fixed option awards for years 1997-2001 (N=1,167)
Market 
Model
Market 
Adjusted
Market 
Model
Market 
Adjusted
(-20,-2) -0.61% (-1.912) * -0.83% (-2.501) ** -0.72% (-2.727) * -0.89% (-2.680) **
(-1,0) -0.04% (-0.342) -0.05% (-0.464) -0.03% (-0.322) -0.05% (-0.443)
(0,+1) 0.29% (2.802) ** 0.28% (2.627) ** 0.28% (2.711) ** 0.27% (2.543) **
(0,+40) 1.62% (3.470) *** 0.91% (1.863) * 1.20% (2.585) ** 0.74% (1.520)
(0,+80) 3.48% (5.304) *** 2.58% (3.747) *** 2.07% (3.167) *** 2.16% (3.140) ***
(0, +120) 3.48% (4.340) *** 2.14% (2.548) ** 0.46% (0.571) 1.48% (1.765) *
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs)
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs)
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs)
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Table 5 
Trading Strategy Abnormal Returns Surrounding the Estimated Grant Date of Stock 
Option Awards 
 
Market 
Model
Market 
Adjusted
Market 
Model
Market 
Adjusted
(-20,-2) -0.13% (-0.409) 0.25% (0.757) -0.03% (-0.098) 0.15% (0.457)
(-1,0) 0.33% (3.193) *** 0.37% (3.443) *** 0.33% (3.220) *** 0.37% (3.476) ***
(0,+1) 0.11% (1.089) 0.14% (1.264) 0.11% (1.110) 0.14% (1.288)
(0,+40) 1.24% (2.642) ** 1.79% (3.675) *** 0.70% (1.499) 1.54% (3.147) ***
(0,+80) 2.55% (3.878) *** 3.62% (5.272) *** 1.07% (1.627) 3.29% (4.797) ***
(0, +120) 2.31% (2.878) ** 3.96% (4.717) *** -1.14% (-1.424) 3.20% (3.815) ***
Market 
Model
Market 
Adjusted
Market 
Model
Market 
Adjusted
(-20,-2) 0.10% (0.306) 0.20% (0.548) -0.03% (-0.100) -0.12% (-0.327)
(-1,0) 0.37% (3.372) *** 0.44% (3.759) *** 0.38% (3.434) *** 0.44% (3.823) ***
(0,+1) 0.12% (1.092) 0.15% (1.299) 0.13% (1.137) 0.16% (1.346)
(0,+40) 1.33% (2.652) ** 1.98% (3.757) *** 0.85% (1.702) * 1.77% (3.355) ***
(0,+80) 2.80% (3.971) *** 3.99% (5.392) *** 1.37% (1.943) * 3.70% (4.993) ***
(0, +120) 2.16% (2.508) ** 3.98% (4.400) *** -1.24% (-1.442) 3.28% (3.622) ***
Market 
Model
Market 
Adjusted
Market 
Model
Market 
Adjusted
(-20,-2) -0.68% (-0.431) -0.26% (-0.158) -1.11% (-0.709) -0.60% (-0.370)
(-1,0) -0.42% (-0.823) -0.40% (-0.756) -0.47% (-0.924) -0.45% (-0.853)
(0,+1) -0.14% (-0.281) -0.02% (-0.044) -0.20% (-0.403) -0.09% (-0.164)
(0,+40) -0.81% (-0.351) -0.82% (-0.342) -1.54% (-0.667) -1.21% (-0.504)
(0,+80) 2.18% (0.673) 2.05% (0.608) 0.47% (0.145) 1.81% (0.535)
(0, +120) -1.51% (-0.382) -1.69% (-0.410) -5.70% (-1.441) -2.83% (-0.687)
Market 
Model
Market 
Adjusted
Market 
Model
Market 
Adjusted
(-20,-2) 2.23% (1.800) * 2.36% (1.849) * 2.00% (1.618) 2.20% (1.723) *
(-1,0) 0.61% (1.518) 0.47% (1.123) 0.60% (1.505) 0.46% (1.112)
(0,+1) 0.36% (0.899) 0.22% (0.535) 0.36% (0.895) 0.22% (0.535)
(0,+40) 2.39% (1.314) 1.64% (0.875) 1.55% (0.852) 1.17% (0.621)
(0,+80) 0.40% (0.156) -0.54% (-0.205) -1.22% (-0.478) -0.94% (-0.358)
(0, +120) 5.16% (1.652) * 3.92% (1.217) 0.91% (0.291) 2.32% (0.719)
Market 
Model
Market 
Adjusted
Market 
Model
Market 
Adjusted
(-20,-2) -2.55% (-1.493) -2.27% (-1.245) -2.62% (-1.535) -2.28% (-1.251)
(-1,0) -0.03% (-0.046) -0.06% (-0.096) 0.00% (-0.005) -0.03% (-0.051)
(0,+1) -0.20% (-0.356) -0.13% (-0.221) -0.14% (-0.254) -0.07% (-0.123)
(0,+40) 0.00% (-0.002) 2.37% (0.884) -0.91% (-0.363) 1.72% (0.641)
(0,+80) 1.95% (0.554) 6.75% (1.794) * 0.00% (0.001) 5.70% (1.513)
(0, +120) 6.42% (1.490) 13.65% (2.967) ** 4.87% (1.129) 14.22% (3.091) ***
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs)
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs)
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs)
Incorrectly forecasted award dates, actual date before forecasted date (early) (N=84)
Incorrectly forecasted award dates, no award occurred although an award date was forecasted (no-grant) (N=37)
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs)
Correctly Forecasted Award Dates (N=904)
Incorrectly forecasted award dates, actual date after forecasted date (late) (N=67)
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs)
All forecasted award dates (N=1,092) 
 96
Figure 1 
Mean cumulative abnormal returns (Market Model and Market Adjusted) from -20 to +120 days around the grant date for 
10,171 awards between 1992 and 2001 
 
This figure depicts the mean cumulative abnormal return for 10,171 CEO stock option awards.  These returns are calculated based upon known, historical information about the 
grant date.  This information is not publicly known until 3-15 months after the grant occurs. 
Market model abnormal return is calculated as: titititit MarketRRRAR
^^^ βα−−=−=  
Market adjusted abnormal return is calculated as: titit MarketRAR −=  
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Figure 2 
Mean cumulative abnormal returns (Market Model and Market Adjusted) from -20 to +120 days around the grant date for 
2,326 fixed option awards between 1992 and 2001 
 
-1.00%
-0.50%
0.00%
0.50%
1.00%
1.50%
2.00%
-20 0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Event Time
C
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
A
b
n
o
r
m
a
l
 
R
e
t
u
r
n
Market Model
Market Adjusted
 
This figure depicts the mean cumulative abnormal return for 2,236 fixed award date CEO stock option grants.  These returns are calculated based upon known, historical 
information about the grant date.  This information is not publicly known until 3-15 months after the grant occurs. 
Market model abnormal return is calculated as: titititit MarketRRRAR
^^^ βα−−=−=  
Market adjusted abnormal return is calculated as: titit MarketRAR −=  
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Figure 3 
Mean trading strategy cumulative abnormal returns (Market Model and Market Adjusted) from -20 to +120 days around the 
estimated grant date for the 1,092 strategy trades between 1996 and 2001 
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This figure depicts the mean cumulative abnormal return for 1,092 trading strategy trade dates.  These returns are calculated based upon estimated option grant dates.     
Market model abnormal return is calculated as: titititit MarketRRRAR
^^^ βα−−=−=  
Market adjusted abnormal return is calculated as: titit MarketRAR −=  
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Figure 4 
Early - Mean trading strategy cumulative abnormal returns (Market Model and Market Adjusted) from -20 to +120 days 
around the estimated grant date for the 84 incorrectly forecasted award dates, actual date before the forecasted date 
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This figure depicts the mean cumulative abnormal return for 84 incorrectly forecasted award dates.  The actual grant date occurred prior to the forecasted award date by 30 
calendar days or more.  These returns are calculated based upon estimated option grant dates.     
Market model abnormal return is calculated as: titititit MarketRRRAR
^^^ βα−−=−=  
Market adjusted abnormal return is calculated as: titit MarketRAR −=  
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Figure 5 
Late - Mean trading strategy cumulative abnormal returns (Market Model and Market Adjusted) from -20 to +120 days 
around the estimated grant date for the 67 incorrectly forecasted award dates, actual date after the forecasted date 
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This figure depicts the mean cumulative abnormal return for 67 incorrectly forecasted award dates.  The actual grant date occurred after to the forecasted award date by 30 calendar 
days or more.  These returns are calculated based upon estimated option grant dates.     
Market model abnormal return is calculated as: titititit MarketRRRAR
^^^ βα−−=−=  
Market adjusted abnormal return is calculated as: titit MarketRAR −=  
 101
Figure 6 
No Grant - Mean trading strategy cumulative abnormal returns (Market Model and Market Adjusted) from -20 to +120 days 
around the estimated grant date for the 37 incorrectly forecasted award dates, actual grant did not occur 
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This figure depicts the mean cumulative abnormal return for 37 incorrectly forecasted award dates.  An actual grant did not occur that year although the strategy forecasted and 
traded based upon estimated option grant dates.     
Market model abnormal return is calculated as: titititit MarketRRRAR
^^^ βα−−=−=  
Market adjusted abnormal return is calculated as: titit MarketRAR −=  
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Figure 7 
On Time - Mean trading strategy cumulative abnormal returns (Market Model and Market Adjusted) from -20 to +120 days 
around the estimated grant date for the 904 correctly forecasted award dates 
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This figure depicts the mean cumulative abnormal return for 904 correctly forecasted award dates.  These returns are calculated based upon estimated option grant dates.     
Market model abnormal return is calculated as: titititit MarketRRRAR
^^^ βα−−=−=  
Market adjusted abnormal return is calculated as: titit MarketRAR −=  
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Figure 8 
Examples of Firm Classification (fixed versus non-fixed) 
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